Category Archives: Reserve Brigade

Court Martial Insights

21 Tuesday Apr 2020

Posted by in 1864, 2nd U.S. Cavalry, Civil War, courts martial, references, research, Reserve Brigade, Uncategorized

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Court martialI first realized the possible value of court martial records when I read Dr. Mark W. Johnson’s excellent book, That Body of Brave Men. Intrigued by what he had to say about the value of the records, I did a bit of investigating.

As I perused the War Department’s General Orders for 1863 and 1864, it struck me that relatively few cavalrymen were court martialed, and even fewer regular cavalrymen. I was able to make copies of a few records on a couple of visits to the National Archives, and friend Bob O’Neill was kind enough to copy another dozen or more. Much to my delight, there is a wealth of information in these files. Nothing book worthy in and of itself, but countless smaller details that bring the larger history to life.

As a case study, let’s take a look at the court martial of Second Lieutenant Peter Rinner of the 2nd U.S. Cavalry in January 1864. Rinner was a veteran whose enlisted service started in the Mexican War, and a first sergeant in the regiment when he was commissioned the year before. I will save the other details of his service for a future post. The charge was drunk on guard. The specification was “while on Provost Guard with his squadron did become so drunk as to be unable to perform his duty as an officer. This at or near the town of Culpeper, Va. On or about the 24th day of December 1863.”

To set the stage a bit, during the winter encampment of 1863-1864 the regular cavalry regiments and possibly others rotated on provost guard duty in the town of Culpeper, Virginia. Without going into the details of the testimony, here is a sampling some of the information I discovered from just this one record.

  • A squadron strong, the guard rotated shifts daily. The squadron was responsible for guard posts in town and pickets in vicinity of the town.
  • The headquarters for the squadron on provost guard was a room in the Virginia Hotel. The officers on guard, typically a captain and two lieutenants, slept together in this room.
  • It was not customary for there to be a formal mounting of the guard when the relief happened within the regiment. Guard posts included the hotel, the Orange & Alexandria railroad depot, and “the church.” This was probably St. Stephen’s Episcopal Church, built in 1821. Specific identification of guards’ names, ranks and companies validated unit roster.
  • Battery G, 2nd U.S. Artillery was located in Culpeper, and its commander, Lt. William N. Dennison, also had a room at the Virginia Hotel. One of the units of the Horse Artillery Brigade, relations between the officers of the battery and the 2nd U.S. Cavalry were cordial enough that there was a party in Dennison’s room on December 23rd which seven officers attended.
  • It was permissible for an officer of the guard to visit a party, drink and play cards as long as his duties were fulfilled and he did not become incapacitated. In this case his squadron commander was present at the time and it was not considered an offense.
  • Company morning report books were required to be signed by commanders every morning, even when the officer was on guard.
  • The regimental adjutant placed officers in arrest, not the company or squadron commander.
  • Division headquarters appointed general courts martial. Brigade headquarters selected the board members selected from the regiments of the accused’s brigade. Both volunteer and regular officers could sit on the court martial of a regular officer. Court martial duty superseded all other duties, including unit movements. The proceedings of the previous day were read to the accused and the court first thing in the morning after the court convened.
  • The 1st New York Dragoons had already joined the Reserve Brigade before the Christmas of 1863.
  • Justice was swift. The court reached its verdict on January 11th. Only two days later, the proceedings were approved by the division commander and sent to Major General Sedgwick, in temporary command of the Army of the Potomac.
  • The Army of the Potomac was cracking down on professionalism during the winter encampment. By February 18th, army headquarters had already published four general court martial orders since January 1st. Each order encompassed the results of multiple courts. This fourth order included four courts ruling on ten officers for various forms of misconduct. All ten were cashiered.

Not every court martial record contains valuable information, but this is definitely a largely underutilized source of primary source material. Another tool available to bring pieces of history to light.

Source: NARA, Record Group 153: Office of the Judge Advocate General. Folder LL1362: Court-Martial of Second Lieutenant Peter Rinner, 2nd U.S. Cavalry, January 1864.

A Christmas Raid – Gordonsville, 1864

28 Friday Dec 2018

Posted by in 1864, 1864 raids, 1st U.S. Cavalry, 2nd U.S. Cavalry, 5th U.S. Cavalry, cavalry, Civil War, Reserve Brigade, Uncategorized

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After the bloodiest year of the war for the 2nd U.S. Cavalry and the Reserve Brigade, troopers must have been looking forward to going into winter camp near Winchester in time for the holidays. After all, they had weathered hard fighting in multiple major battles in two different campaigns in two different areas over the course of the year. General Early’s army had been soundly defeated, and there were no Confederate forces of any strength remaining in the Shenandoah Valley the week before Christmas. Imagine their surprise, then, when the following order was received:

“Field Orders, Headquarters First Cavalry Division, December 18, 1864

The command will be prepared to march early to-morrow morning. Four Days’ rations will be issued and carried on the horses. Each man will be supplied with eighty rounds of carbine ammunition and the usual supply of pistol ammunition.

The Second Brigade will take along one section (rifled) of its battery, the best horses being selected for the march. Camp guards consisting of the dismounted men, and those mounted on unserviceable horses, will be left in camp in each brigade under charge of a field officer. The ranking field officer will take charge of the entire division camp, picketing and making other necessary dispositions for its safety.

No other wheels save those mentioned above will accompany the expedition, save the following: Six ambulances, two wagons to division headquarters, one wagon to brigade headquarters, three wagons for commissary supplies.

These preparations must all be made at once. Further instructions will be given as to the time of march, &c.

By command of Brevet Major General Merritt:

A.E. Dana, Assistant Adjutant-General.”

And so began ten miserable days of winter campaigning. Although General Sheridan had written somewhat dismissively to General Grant on the usefulness of cutting the Central Railroad to interdict Confederate supplies between the Shenandoah Valley and Richmond, he ordered the raid. In case there were any Confederate forces in the area, he ordered General Custer to take his division south through the Valley at the same time Torbert was departing with the other two divisions of the cavalry. General Torbert’s report is a pretty detailed account of the raid.

Headquarters Cavalry Corps, Army of the Middle Military Division

Winchester, Va., December 28, 1864

Sir: I have the honor to report that I started from Winchester on the 19th of December, with the First and Second Divisions of Cavalry, without artillery, about 5,000 men, across the Blue Ridge. On the night of the 19th I camped in Chester Gap, having marched about twenty-two miles, via Front Royal, crossing both branches of the Shenandoah River. It rained nearly all day. December 20, crossed the Blue Ridge, marched via Little Washington, Gaines’ Cross-Roads, and Sperryville, in the direction of Criglersville; marched about twenty-nine miles, Second Division camping on the Hughes River and the First Division on the Hazel. This night it hailed and sleeted all night. During the day the enemy’s vedettes were driven before the advance. December 21, at daylight the march was resumed, in a hail and snow storm which lasted all day, via Criglersville, to Madison Court-House, over one the worst roads I ever traveled. The First Division went to Madison Court-House, had an engagement with Jackson’s brigade of rebel cavalry, driving them from the town, with slight loss. Second Division camped on Robertson’s River near Criglersville. December 22, at daylight the march was resumed, Second Division leading, on the pike in the direction Liberty Mills and Gordonsville. The enemy’s cavalry – Generals Jackson’s and McCausland’s brigades, General Lomax commanding – were driven rapidly before my advance and across the bridge over the Rapidan, at Liberty Mills. On my advance reaching the bridge, which they did under a severe fire from men behind breast-works on the opposite bank, they found some of the flooring of the bridge had been removed. Immediately after reaching the river the bridge was fired by an explosion and soon destroyed. The ford, wich was a bad one, was barricaded and defended by men in rifle pits and artillery in position behind earth-works. It was impossible to effect a crossing in front. Some delay was caused by having to send through the country to find parties who knew the roads to fords above and below Liberty Mills, so that I could cross and flank them out of their position. Finally two columns were started, one to the right and one to the left. Two brigades of the First Division – First and Second, Second Brigade leading, commanded by Colonel Kellogg, 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry – were to cross at Willis’ Ford, about two miles above Liberty Mills, and come down on the Stanardsville and Orange Court-House road. One brigade Second Division, Colonel Capehart commanding, was to cross at Cave’s Ford, about three miles below Liberty Mills, and come up on the Orange Court-House and Stanardsville road. It was represented that both of these fords were good, and that the detour of these columns would be about four miles, when, in fact, the column at Willis’ Ford could only cross by twos and had to march about eight miles before getting to Liberty Mills, and the column by Cave’s Ford could only cross by file and had to march about seven miles before getting to Liberty Mills. This caused an unexpected delay, and it was not until just dark when the right column came in sight and immediately charged the enemy, driving them across the Gordonsville pike and in the direction of Orange Court-House; here they were met by my left column, and the enemy withdrew by a country road in the direction of Gordonsville. The fighting was all after dark, and not being able to tell friend from foe, and my own men having fired into each other, the firing was ordered to cease and hold their positions for the night. This day and night was intensely cold. December 23, at daylight the enemy was again engaged and all their artillery – two pieces – taken from them, and driven to within two miles and a half of Gordonsville to the top of the gap in Southwest Mountain. Here the pass was narrow and the enemy were strongly posted behind rails and earth breast-works, where a few men could hold three times their number in check. I attacked the position with nearly half of my force, but could not carry it, and I immediately started a column to flank them on the left by crossing the mountain several miles to the north. While waiting to hear from this column, which had got well on its way, the cars were heard about ten o’clock to arrive at Gordonsville, and about an hour after infantry was seen to file into the breast-works and relieve the cavalry. After becoming fully satisfied of the presence of infantry (Pegram’s division), I concluded it was useless to make a further attempt to break the Central railroad. I had at this time six or eight men killed and about forty wounded, more than I could transport, and the worst cases were left behind. I decided to withdraw and at once crossed to the north bank of the Rapidan. That afternoon and evening I marched to Madison Court-House and Robertson’s River. About thirty prisoners were taken, but having no provisions, and it being very difficult, if not impossible, for them to keep up, I paroled them. The guns, two 3-inch rifled, were brought to camp. December 24, at daylight started from Madison Court-House, marched, via James City, Griffinsburg, and Stone-House Mountain, to near Rixeyville. December 25, at daylight marched to the Fauquier White Sulphur Springs, crossing in the meantime the Hazel and the Rappahannock Rivers, the former with great difficulty indeed. December 26, march resumed at daylight, Second Division leading. On reaching Warrenton the Second Division went in the direction of Salem and Piedmont, camping near Paris. At Warrenton the First Division marched in the direction of New Baltimore, Georgetown, White Plains, and Middleburg, camping near the latter place. December 27, the Second Division marched, via Paris, Ashby’s Gap, to Millwood. December 28, First Division marched to camp near Winchester.

The country through which we passed was thoroughly cleaned of stock and forage. The command was obliged to live on the country for six days. Altogether it was an extremely hard trip on men and horses on account of the intense cold and bad weather. For six days out of the ten it either rained, hailed, or snowed, and sometimes all three.

A.T.A. Torbert,

Brevet Major General, Chief of Cavalry, Commanding.

To Brevet Brigadier General Forsyth, Chief of Staff, Headquarters Army of the Shenandoah.”

Total casualties from the raid were 7 killed, 38 wounded, 47 missing, 10 accidentally hurt, for an aggregate of 102. Torbert does not mention frostbite injuries, but there were over two hundred cases in his force, which was half as large and whose raid was half the duration of Torbert’s. Two hundred fifty eight horses were lost, over five percent of the total, showing the effects of weather and distance on the mounts.

Sources:

Official Records, Volume 43, Part I, pages 677-679 and Part II, page 803.

The Death of Charles Russell Lowell

21 Tuesday Oct 2014

Posted by in 1864, 6th U.S. Cavalry, battle of Cedar Creek, officers, Reserve Brigade

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Lowell

Craig Swain’s post yesterday here on fallen leaders at Cedar Creek jogged a memory. I knew I had seen a contemporary account of the death of Charles Russell Lowell, but couldn’t remember where. Lowell had an interesting position during the battle. He was a captain in the 6th U.S. Cavalry and colonel of the Second Massachusetts Cavalry, both present at the battle, and in command of both regiments as the commander of the Reserve Brigade.

Today, I remembered where I had seen it. Charles A. Humphreys was the regimental chaplain for the 2nd Massachusetts Cavalry from 1863 through the end of the war. As the chaplain, he frequently encountered the regimental commander, so one must expect a bit of bias. In his postwar history of the regiment, Field, Camp, Hospital and Prison in the Civil War, 1861-1865, Humphreys chronicles Lowell’s passing.

“I have already told how my gallant Colonel, in this month’s campaign in which he was every day under fire, seemed to bear a charmed life, having had thirteen horses shot out from under him — one of them struck in seven places — and his clothes riddled with bullets. He had not himself been touched till the third charge in the Battle of Cedar Creek, when a spent ball for a moment took away his breath and afterwards left him voiceless. General Torbert urged that he be taken from the field. But Lowell whispered: “No! It is only my poor lung. I have not lost a drop of blood yet. I want to lead in the final charge.” So a little parapet of earth was thrown up to shield him from the bullets of the enemy, and he lay there motionless for two hours, having exacted a promise that he should be told when the charge was ordered. This came about three o’clock. Then, though too weak to mount his horse without assistance, he said, “I am well, now,” and allowed his faithful men to lift him into the saddle, and he rode to the front amid the cheers of his troops. Then his strength rose with the occasion, and though the death flush was on his cheeks he rode firm and erect as ever, and though he could only whisper his commands to his aids, [sic] all saw by the pointing of his sword that he meant Forward to victory or death.

“Just as they were in the thickest of the fight, Lowell — still leading on his men — was pierced by a bullet from shoulder to shoulder and fell into the arms of his aids [sic]. Yet even thus he would not check the vigor of the assault, but allowed himself to be carried forward in the track of his rapidly advancing brigade till he reached the village of Middletown and saw that the battle was won. Then he lay down upon his death-couch as calmly as to a night’s repose, and, though partially paralyzed, he remained for a time conscious, and gave minute directions about the business of his command, dictated some private messages of affection, and twice directed his surgeon to leave him to look to the wounds of other officers and of some wounded prisoners whose cries of pain he overheard, and then quietly and contentedly went to sleep and waked no more on earth.”

Obviously Humphreys uses a bit of poetic license in his account. From the nature of his final wound and other accounts of his fall, it seem far more likely that he was in the village or on its outskirts when he was shot.

Lowell was mourned across the Cavalry Corps. His division commander’s comments were contained in the previous post, and his corps commander, A.T.A. Torbert, commented in this excerpt from official report:

“In this general advance Colonel Lowell, Second Massachusetts Cavalry, commanding reserve Brigade, First Division, while charging at the head of his brigade, received a second wound, which proved to be mortal. Thus the service lost one of its most gallant and accomplished soldiers. He was the beau ideal of a cavalry officer, and his memory will never die in the command.”

Sources:

Humphreys, Charles A. Field, Camp, Hospital and Prison in the Civil War, 1861-1865. Boston: Geo. H. Ellis Co., 1918. Pages 179-181.

Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 43, Part 1, Page 434.

Photograph of Charles Russell Lowell in 1864, USAMHI.

150 Years Ago: Cedar Creek

19 Sunday Oct 2014

Posted by in 1864, 1st U.S. Cavalry, 2nd U.S. Cavalry, battle of Cedar Creek, Reserve Brigade

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150 years ago today, the battle of Cedar Creek was fought. The previous month’s defeat had all but ended the campaign the month before, but Confederate general Jubal Early cast one last throw of the dice to try to destroy Sheridan’s army.

I have decided to include two versions of the regular cavalry’s piece of the battle. The first and most direct, is an excerpt from the official report of the Reserve Brigade commander, Lieutenant Colonel Casper Crowninshield, on the battle. It is very brief and to the point, as he assumed command of the brigade toward the end of the battle.

“October 17, remained in camp, picketing on right of First Brigade. October 18, remained in camp, picketing as before. October 19, broke camp at daylight and moved to the right of the infantry on a reconnaissance for the purpose of ascertaining the position of the enemy; found their cavalry in force; skirmished with them about an hour, when orders were received to fall back, as the whole army had been attacked; proceeded to the left of the infantry and formed skirmish line, connecting with infantry on the right and First Brigade on left; Second Massachusetts made two charges on the enemy’s infantry, checking their advance; held our position until 3 p.m., when the whole line advanced, and this brigade, together with Second Brigade, charged a battery of the enemy’s artillery; were repulsed, with considerable loss, Colonel Lowell being mortally wounded while leading his command in the charge. Lieutenant Colonel Crowninshield, Second Massachusetts Cavalry, assumed command of brigade. The enemy’s line commenced to fall back, when we again charged, pursuing them down the pike and across Cedar Creek. Here we were halted and ordered to fall back, recrossed the creek, and camped on left of infantry.” (Official Records, Series I, Volume 43, Part 1, page 492)

The official report of the division commander, Brigadier General Wesley Merritt, is typically much more animated and verbose.

“HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION,
October 24, 1864.

MAJOR: I respectfully submit the following report of the part this division took in the battle of the 19th and subsequent operations:

About 4 a. m. on the 19th an attack was made on the pickets of the First Brigade near Cupp’s Ford, which attack, coupled with the firing on the extreme left of the infantry line, alarmed the camps, and everything was got ready for immediate action. The First Brigade was at once ordered to move to the support of its picket-line, while the Reserve Brigade, which had the night before received orders to make a reconnaissance on the Middle road, was ordered to halt and await further orders. This brigade had advanced in the execution of its reconnaissance to the picket-line, and subsequently acted for a short time with the First Brigade in repelling the attack of the enemy feebly made on that part of the field. Soon after moving from camp the heavy artillery firing, and immense number of infantry stragglers making across the country to the Back road from our left, showed that it was in that direction the heavy force of the enemy was advancing. The Fifth U. S. Cavalry, attached to division headquarters, was immediately deployed across the fields, and, together with the officers and orderlies of the division staff, did much toward preventing the infantry going to the rear, and forced everyone to stop and form line. About this time the Second Brigade (General Devin) was ordered to move to the left of the line, cover and hold the pike, and at the saline time deploy men in that part of the field to prevent fugitives from going to the rear; this General Devin quickly accomplished, and did good service, especially in preventing the infantry straggling. On moving to the left General Devin ordered his battery to report to division headquarters, where Lieutenant Taylor, commanding, received orders to advance to an eligible position on the infantry line of battle, and use his pieces on the enemy till such time as it was unsafe to remain there. Great credit is due Lieutenant Taylor for the prompt and efficient manner in which he carried out this order. He was well advanced to the front of battle, without supports from his own command, and none save what was offered by the thin and wavering line of infantry near his position. The artillery of the infantry had gone unaccountably to the rear, or had been captured by the enemy, and Taylor’s was the only battery for some time on that part of the field. It is thought that his rapid and destructive fire did much toward preventing a farther advance of the enemy on that flank in the early part of the day. About 10 o’clock, in compliance with orders from the chief of cavalry, the First Division was moved to the left of the infantry line and disposed so as to connect with the infantry and at the same time cover the Valley pike and the country to the left. This was soon done — the Second Brigade (Devin’s) occupying the right, the Reserve Brigade (Lowell’s) the center, and the First Brigade (Kidd’s) the left of the division line of battle. Orders were then sent to each brigade to press the enemy warmly, and Lowell was cautioned to watch his opportunity and charge a battery of the enemy which seemed exposed in the open country to the left of the pike. Never did troops fight more elegantly than at this time; not a man shirked his duty, not a soldier who did not conduct himself like a hero. All through the day each man fought with the instinct and judgment of an officer and with the courage for which this division has become so celebrated. Twice or thrice by movements in the infantry line on our right the enemy got in the flank of the division line and subjected it to a murderous fire; but there was no movement on the part of the men save that demanded by superior judgment for a fresh disposition to meet the contingency; no running, no confusion, where at one time among so many others there was the most intense demoralization. The line at this time, in compliance with orders given as above stated, advanced nearly to Middletown, driving the enemy before it through the open country, the gallant Lowell, as usual, with his noble command forcing from the enemy every available inch of ground. This advance was handsomely made by all the brigades; at the time it was intended more as an offensive-defensive movement than one looking to a final victory. The enemy withdrew from the open country, evidently fearing the attack of the cavalry, and the battery which was marked for attack and possible capture also withdrew to a safer position. Sheltered by the woods on each flank and the houses and fences of Middletown, the enemy (Kershaw’s and Pegram’s divisions) in our front, Kershaw on the extreme right, continued a sharp skirmish, varied by attacks on both sides, until the final advance by the whole army under the major-general commanding Shortly after taking position on the left of the line as above described, Colonel Moore’s brigade, Second Division, was ordered to report to the First Division for orders. This brigade, having skirmishers on the line to the left of the pike, was ordered to advance with the line of the First Division; it did so handsomely, fighting with spirit while it remained with1 the command; it was ordered to the left toward Front Royal later in the day by the chief of cavalry. During the entire day the enemy kept up an artillery fire on our position whit h was truly terrific; it has seldom been equaled for accuracy of aim and excellence of ammunition. The batteries attached to this division did nobly, but were overpowered at times by weight of metal and superior ammunition. So excellent was the practice of the enemy that it was utterly impossible to cover a cavalry command from the artillery fire; a number of horses and men were destroyed by this arm during the day. As the news spread through the command that the major-general commanding the army had arrived a cheer went up from each brigade in this division; every officer in the command felt there was victory at hand; they all had confidence in him who had formerly commanded them more directly in trying circumstances, and when the order was given for a general advance each veteran in the First Division bent his brow resolutely and rode fearlessly toward the goal. Words are but poor vehicles to convey a description of the scene; suffice it to say, the charge was successfully made, each brigade doing its duty nobly. The Reserve and Second Brigades charged into a living wall of the enemy which, receiving the shock, emitted a leaden sheet of fire upon their devoted ranks; but the enemy were broken and fled before the resistless force of the blow, coupled with the stern, steady, unrelenting, yet swift, advance of the infantry, who, under the new regime, excited the admiration of all beholders.

The First Brigade, in column of regiments in line, moved forward like an immense wave, slowly at first, but gathering strength and speed as it progressed, overwhelmed a battery and its supports amidst a desolating shower of canister and a deadly fire of musketry from part of Kershaw’s division, at short range, from a heavy wood to our left. Never has the mettle of the division been put to a severer test than at this time, and never .did it stand the test better. The charge was made on an enemy well formed, prepared to receive it with guns double-shotted with canister. Into that fearful charge rode many a noble spirit who met his death. One more prominent than the rest, if individual prominence among a band of heroes is possible, received his death wound — the fearless Lowell, at the head of as gallant a brigade as ever rode at a foe, fell in the thickest of the fray, meeting his death as he had always faced it — calmly, resolutely, heroically. His fall cast a gloom on the entire command. No one in the field appreciated his worth more than his division commander. He was wounded painfully in the early part of the day, soon after which I met him; he was suffering acutely from his wound, but to ask him to leave the field was to insult him almost; a more gallant soldier never buckled on a saber. His coolness and judgment on the held were unequaled. An educated and accomplished gentleman, his modest, amiable, yet independent, demeanor endeared him to all his superiors in rank; his inflexible justice, temperate, yet unflinching, conduct of discipline made him respected and loved by his subordinates. He was upright as a mall, pure as a patriot, and preeminently free from the finesse of the politician. His last breath was warm with commendations of his comrades in arms and devotion to his country’s cause. Young in years, he died too early for his country, leaving a brilliant record for future generations, ending a career which gave bright promise of yet greater usefulness and glory.

After the charge our ranks were soon formed and the command moved forward resistlessly to Cedar Creek. Part of the enemy’s forces which had bed by the fords below were followed by detachments of the First and Reserve Brigades, which captured quite a number of prisoners, the First Brigade adding another to its trophies in the shape of a battle-flag. The Second and Reserve Brigades moved to Cedar Creek (the Second Brigade in advance), charged across the fords and bridge, pursuing the enemy with unparalleled vigor to his stronghold — Fisher’s Hill — leaving, like the whirlwind, nothing but the wreck in their track to be gathered up.” In this pursuit the Second Brigade lost heavily. I respectfully call attention to the report of General Devin, commanding Second Brigade, who ably conducted this movement. Great credit is due him for his untiring energy and determination in following up the victory, toward which he and his gallant command had done as much during the entire day as men could do. The Reserve Brigade was also ” in at the death,” but, in compliance with orders, halted and formed as a reserve, while the First and Second Brigades pursued the enemy on their different roads. Night alone saved Early’s demoralized army from total annihilation. As it was, he carried off with him but five pieces of artillery and but few other wheels.

The following morning (October 20) the division moved to Fisher’s Hill, where a small force of the enemy’s cavalry was found. This disappeared from our front and the command was pushed on to Woodstock. At that point it was ascertained from citizens and prisoners that the enemy was some distance in advice. The First and Second Brigades were halted and the Reserve Brigade ordered on toward Edenburg, beyond which point it went, without, however, coming up With the dying enemy. During this pursuit a number of wagons, ambulances, caissons, arms, &c., abandoned by the enemy, were found on the road and destroyed.

During the battle and subsequent pursuit the following captures were made and property destroyed by the division: 3 battle flags, 22 pieces of artillery, 8 caissons, 37 ambulances, 29 wagons, 95 horses and harness, 141 mules and harness, 389 prisoners of war, including 6 commissioned officers; two of the above wagons were loaded with muskets. Property destroyed; 12 army wagons, 28 ambulances, 81 muskets, 2 caissons
In concluding this report I must again return my acknowledgments to my staff and subordinate commanders for their untiring energy and zeal ill the performance of their duties and implicit and unquestioning obedience to orders; they are commended to the notice of superior headquarters.
The men and officers of the command have endured all the hardships of the arduous campaign without the comforts afforded by a regular system of transportation, oftentimes without regular issues of rations uncomplainingly and cheerfully. If there have been any instances of unsoldierly conduct they are exceptions to the rule. The command as a whole is gallant and well disciplined, confident in its own strength and justly proud of its prowess.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. MERRITT
Brevet Major-General, Commanding Division.” (Official Records, Series I, Volume 43, Part 1, pages 448-452)

Despite the effusive description of their role in the battle, casualties in the Reserve Brigade were relatively light. The total was only 37 killed, wounded and missing, broken down as follows:

2d MA Cav: 1 officer killed, 6 men killed; 3 officers and 13 men wounded; 1 man captured or missing. (24)
1st US Cav: 2 men killed; 5 men wounded. (7)
2nd US Cav: 2 officers and 4 men wounded. (6)
(Ibid., page 137)

150 Years Ago: Battle of Opequon, or Third Winchester

19 Friday Sep 2014

Posted by in 1864, 1st U.S. Cavalry, 2nd U.S. Cavalry, 5th U.S. Cavalry, Battle of Winchester, Casualties, Reserve Brigade

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Today marks the 150th anniversary of the battle of Opequon, or Third Winchester. While the cavalry was primarily involved in the larger fight at its culmination, with the first of the large scale charges that became its hallmark under Sheridan, they still had a busy day.
Rather than try to hastily sketch the battle into a blog post, I have decided to let one of the participants tell the story in his own words. For those desiring more in depth information on the battle, I strongly recommend The Last Battle of Winchester by Scott Patchan. It is the best treatment of the battle that I’ve seen.

The closest commander to the source for my purposes is Reserve Brigade commander Colonel Charles R. Lowell. He served through the Peninsula campaign as a lieutenant and captain in the 6th U.S. Cavalry before he was selected to command a regiment of volunteers, the Second Massachusetts. This was his first major engagement as a brigade commander.

The Reserve Brigade consisted of four regiments of cavalry for this battle. Since Colonel Lowell commanded the brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Casper Crowninshield commanded the 2nd Massachusetts. He was the senior regimental commander. Captain Eugene M. Baker commanded the 1st U.S. Cavalry. The 2nd U.S. Cavalry was commanded by Captain Theophilus F. Rodenbough until he was severely wounded near the end of the day’s fighting, then by Captain Robert S. Smith. Lieutenant Gustavus Urban, the former regimental sergeant major, commanded the 5th U.S. Cavalry. The 6th Pennsylvania, under command of Major Charles L. Leiper, was ordered to the remount camp at Pleasant Valley, Maryland on September 8th and was not present for the battle.

Colonel Lowell’s report for the period encompasses two weeks of maneuver by the brigade, so I have excerpted his words on the battle:

“September 19, marched at 2 a.m.; reached Opequon at Seiver’s Ford before daybreak. The enemy’s picket-line was driven in by Second U.S. Cavalry and Second Massachusetts Cavalry, about forty prisoners being taken, and the opposite bank of the creek occupied in a line of about three miles, the right connecting with the First Brigade. A very gallant charge was made by Second U.S. Cavalry on one of Breckinridge’s batteries, but was repulsed, the infantry supports being well placed behind rails breast high, a simultaneous charge by the First Brigade being also repulsed. Soon after noon the whole line was advanced to the Martinsburg pike; the brigade was necessarily much scattered. Two squadrons of the Second Massachusetts Cavalry joined the charge of the Second Brigade on the enemy’s infantry; the rest of that regiment got mixed up with the skirmish line of Averell’s division. The First, Second, and Fifth U.S. Cavalry advanced toward Winchester, on the left of the pike; charged a battery supported by infantry and cavalry; captured two guns, with their caissons and most of the horses and drivers. What part of these regiments could be rallied assisted in the subsequent charge of the First Brigade upon a brigade of the enemy’s infantry. After dark the brigade was moved through Winchester and camped two miles out on the Valley pike.”

The Reserve Brigade’s total casualties for the battle were 103, including killed, wounded and missing. This was a little more than a third of the First Division’s 288, but the brigade was roughly half the size of Custer’s First Brigade and Devin’s Second Brigade. One of the men of the Reserve Brigade, First Sergeant Conrad Schmidt of the 2nd U.S. Cavalry, earned the Medal of Honor during the battle, but that will be detailed in a separate post.

I was not able to identify the members of the 2nd Massachusetts Cavalry killed during the battle. Regimental casualties included 3 men killed, 3 officers and 8 men wounded, 1 officer and 5 men missing or captured. Those of the three regular regiments are listed below.

1st U.S. Cavalry
First Sergeant Henry Montville, Co. C, KIA
Corporal Jacob McAtlee, Co. G, KIA
Private Ledoux Lewis, Co. I, KIA
Private John Siedler, Co. C, KIA
One officer and 13 men wounded, 6 men missing or captured.

2nd U.S. Cavalry
Captain James F. McQuesten, serving on brigade staff, KIA
Corporal Edward Sheehy, Co. K, KIA
Two officers and 17 men wounded, 1 officer and 7 men missing or captured.

5th U.S. Cavalry
Lieutenant Richard Fitzgerald, Co. I, KIA
Corporal Michael Howard, Co. E, KIA
Private Albert Bigmore, Co. G, KIA
Private Henry Curry, Co. I, KIA
Three officers and 9 men wounded, 12 men missing or captured

Sources:

National Archives, Record Group 94, U.S. Returns from Regular Army Non-infantry Regiments, 1821-1916: 1st, 2nd and 5th U.S. Cavalry
National Archives, U.S. Army Register of Enlistments, 1798-1914
National Archives, U.S., Register of Deaths in the Regular Army, 1860-1889
OR, Series I, Volume 43, part 1, page 111. (task organization and commanders)
OR, Series I, Volume 43, part 1, page 117. (casualty totals)
OR, Series I, Volume 43, part 1, page 490. (Lowell’s report)

150 Years Ago: Trevillian Station

12 Thursday Jun 2014

Posted by in 1864, 1864 raids, 1st U.S. Cavalry, 2nd U.S. Cavalry, 5th U.S. Cavalry, battle of Trevillian Station, Casualties, Reserve Brigade

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150 years ago today, the cavalry forces of the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia collided in the largest all cavalry battle of the Civil War at Trevillian Station. For two days the forces went at each other hammer and tongs, in some of the fiercest cavalry fighting of the war.

Rather than craft yet another summary of the battle on its anniversary, I decided to focus on the official report of the battle and on identifying the casualties from the regular regiments.

The official report of Brigadier General Wesley Merritt, commanding the Reserve Brigade, covers the period from May 26th to June 25th, so I’ve chosen to excerpt only those sections relevant to the fighting at Trevillian Station.

“On the 7th the brigade marched with the division, crossing the Pamunkey on the second expedition. On the 8th, 9th and 10th of June the march was continued without event.

“On the 11th the brigade left camp at 5 a.m., moving toward Gordonsville. The Second Cavalry, forming the advance guard, soon encountered the enemy’s pickets, which were driven in and the main body of the enemy engaged. Captain Rodenbough handled his gallant regiment with great skill and unexampled valor, charging and driving the enemy mounted, and forcing him, as usual, to cover. Captain Rodenbough was here wounded, as also Lieutenant Horrigan, of the Second. Here also Lieutenant Lawless, of the same regiment, was killed. He was a fearless, honest, and eminently trustworthy soldier, “God’s truth” being the standard by which he measured all his actions. The entire brigade was soon engaged, the First on the left, and the First New York Dragoons on the extreme right. On the left of this latter was the Sixth Pennsylvania, and next the Second Cavalry, now commanded by Capt. D.S. Gordon. The Fifth Cavalry was held as a support to the battery. The enemy was driven through a thick tangled brushwood for over 2 miles to Trevilian Station, on the Virginia Central Railroad, but not without serious loss to ourselves, though we inflicted heavy punishment on the adversary in killed, wounded, and prisoners. [start pg 850] Among his wounded was General Rosser, commanding Hampton’s old division, and a colonel commanding a brigade was killed, his body, along with most of the enemy’s killed and wounded, falling into our hands. Few less than 200 prisoners, including 6 or 8n officers, were taken by the brigade. The enemy’s retreat finally became a rout, led horses, mounted men, and artillery all fled together in the wildest confusion. Williston, with his battery, took position near by, and did elegant practice with his guns, planting shells in the midst of the confused masses of the retreating enemy. Trevilian Station was thus gained. In this retreat part of the enemy went toward Gordonsville, while fragments were driven off on the road to Louisa Court-House. In their headlong career these latter came in contact with the First Brigade, which, being engaged toward its rear by the advance of Fitzhugh Lee’s division coming from Louisa Court-House, was compelled to abandon some captures it had made from the led horses and trains of the force that was engaging the rest of the First Division, as above described. This brigade soon formed a junction and took position to the left rear of the Reserve Brigade. In the meanwhile, Fitz. Lee’s division advanced on the Louisa Court-House road and took up a line on the left of the Reserve Brigade, his line being perpendicular to the last. The two parts of the line at this time formed a right angle, the Reserve Brigade occupying the right of the line, to the vortex of the angle, the second Brigade on its left, occupying part of the other line, and the First Brigade, with the Second Division, remained in echelon to the left rear, as above mentioned.

“On the night of the 11th the enemy retired from our left front and took up position on the Gordonsville front.

“About 3 p.m. on the 12th the brigade was ordered to attack the enemy’s left, while it was intended that the First Brigade should co-operate on its left, while the Second Brigade of the division was held in reserve. The brigade went in on an open field to its right and attacked the enemy’s left flank vigorously. It was slow work, however, and as the enemy was not pressed on the left he concentrated his force on the brigade, and by large numbers and fresh troops, gave the command as much as it could attend to. Still both officers and men stood up to their work, doing manfully all that their former prowess would lead the most sanguine to expect, holding everything they had gained on the left, where the line was weakest, and driving the enemy on the right before them in expectation of a general advance. In thus advancing the right of the brigade was so swung round as to be exposed to the enemy’s attack on its wing. This he was not slow to take advantage of, when a squadron of the Second Cavalry, my only remaining mounted support to the battery, was thrown in to meet the attack. Here again the Second did nobly. Coming up on the right of the Sixth Pennsylvania, which up to that time had been the extreme right regiment in line, they charged gallantly, and, though few in numbers, by the impetuosity of their onslaught, drove the enemy back and protected the right until relieved by two regiments of the Second Brigade (the Fourth and Sixth New York). After these two regiments got in position this squadron of the Second was withdrawn to again act as support to the battery, which was ordered to advance, a good position having been gained on the right. Right gallantly did the battery come up in the midst of a heavy musketry fire, we being at that time so close to the enemy that their shells all flew far over us. Planting three [start pg 851] guns of the battery in this position, where it dealt the enemy heavy blows, Lieutenant Williston moved one of his brass 12-pounders onto the skirmish line. In fact, the line was moved to the front to allow him to get an eligible position, where he remained with his gun, in the face of the strengthened enemy (who advanced to its very muzzle), dealing death and destruction in their ranks with double loads of canister. It was now dark and I was ordered to retire the brigade, which was done slowly and leisurely, the enemy not advancing. This day the loss of the brigade was heavy for the numbers engaged. The general advance was not made.” (Official Records, Vol. 36, Pt. 1, pgs 850-852)

While I was able to track down the names of almost all the casualties from the battle, I felt that listing all of the wounded made the post overly long. Only the names of those killed are listed, as well as the numbers of wounded and missing. The four officers killed in the battle will be featured separately over the course of the remainder of the month.

1st US Cavalry:

Killed in action:

1LT John H. Nichols

1LT Frederick Ogden

Sgt E. Jackson, Co. H

Sgt William Mulcahy, Co. M

Sgt James Rathburn, Co. C

Pvt Henry Lynch, Co. D

Pvt John Normyle, Co. E

Pvt George Ott, Co. K

Pvt H.S.P. Petro, Co. D

An additional 29 enlisted men were wounded, three of them dying of wounds later in the month. Six enlisted men were listed as missing in action.

2nd US Cavalry:

Killed in action:

1LT Michael Lawless, Co. A

Sgt Christian Fisher, Co. M

Pvt Thomas Corbett, Co. A

Pvt Edward Gorman, Co. B

Pvt James Ferris, Co. F

Pvt Ariel C. Chapin, Co. K

Pvt James Levens, Co. L

Pvt Patrick McArdle, Co. E

 

An additional two officers, including regimental commander Captain T. F. Rodenbough and 1st Lieutenant Patrick Horrigan, and 34 enlisted men were wounded. Captain Charles McK. Leoser and two enlisted men were listed as missing in action.

 

5th US Cavalry:

Killed in action:

1LT Joseph P. Henley, Co. I

Corp Charles E. Asher, Co. G

Pvt Patrick Keeney, Co. G

 

An additional two enlisted men were wounded, and two more were listed as missing in action. The 5th US Cavalry’s casualties appear light in comparison to the other two regiments, but over half of the regiment did not participate in the battle.

150 Years Ago: Todd’s Tavern

12 Monday May 2014

Posted by in 1864, 1st U.S. Cavalry, 2nd U.S. Cavalry, 5th U.S. Cavalry, Casualties, cavalry, Reserve Brigade, Spotsylvania Court House

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After the two days of heavy fighting in the Wilderness, General Grant decided to move around Lee’s flank toward Spotsylvania Court House. In order to get there, his cavalry would have to clear the Brock Road and take the crossroads at Todd’s Tavern to cut the Confederate route to Spotsylvania. General Lee, divining Grant’s intent, tasked his own cavalry to protect the Confederate route to Spotsylvania and slow down the Union advance. This would lead to some of the most intense cavalry combat to this point in the war.

Ironically, Major General Sheridan’s Union cavalry had held Todd’s Tavern during the previous two days of fighting in the Wilderness, but withdrew them on the night of May 6th toward Chancellorsville. This allowed General Fitzhugh Lee’s Confederate cavalry to reoccupy the crossroads and make improvements to earthworks previously constructed by Union forces.

Sheridan planned a two-pronged attack which would meet at the crossroads on May 7th. The First Division would advance south and clear the Brock Road from Catherine Furnace, while the Second Division would advance west up the Catharpin Road. Once the crossroads was seized, the Second Division would continue west and seize Corbin’s Bridge over the Po River, further hindering Confederate efforts to reach Spotsylvania.

General Alfred Torbert required surgery for an abscess in his back, so Brigadier General Wesley Merritt commanded the First Division, while Colonel Alfred Gibbs assumed command of the Reserve Brigade. Major General David McM. Gregg commanded the Second Division.

The Union plan was initially successful. Merritt’s division met Fitz Lee’s Confederates at 3 p.m. about a mile north of Todd’s Tavern. Gibbs, whose Reserve Brigade led the division, dismounted and deployed his lead regiment, the 6th Pennsylvania, as skirmishers to the left of the road. Gibbs’ official report describes the deployment of the rest of the brigade:

“Finding the enemy to be in force, consisting of, it is believed, Fitzhugh Lee’s division of cavalry, the First U.S. Cavalry and First New York Dragoons were deployed as skirmishers, on foot, to the left of the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry. The Fifth U.S. Cavalry was deployed similarly on the right side of the road.”

As Merritt engaged the Confederate cavalry, Gregg’s division arrived on their right flank, near Piney Branch Church. Lee conducted a fighting withdrawal to the south. Once Merritt had driven the Confederates south of the crossroads, Gregg advanced as planned toward Corbin’s Bridge. He was met a mile west of the crossroads by Rosser’s brigade of Confederate cavalry from Wade Hampton’s division. In heavy dismounted fighting, Gregg was able to force Rosser back to the bridge, but withdrew to the tavern after Hampton’s remaining two brigades moved to Rosser’s support.

In the meantime Merritt, aided by Davies’ brigade of Gregg’s division advancing on Lee’s right flank on the Piney Branch Road, forced Fitzhugh Lee’s division farther south. Two miles south of the tavern, Lee established a new defensive line in some existing log barricades. Merritt attacked him there in the late afternoon in the deadliest phase of the battle. The Reserve Brigade’s deployment remained the same, adding, “The Second U.S. Cavalry was held mounted on the extreme left, while Williston’s battery came into position on a high ridge in rear, where they did excellent service, silencing the enemy’s battery and killing and wounding several of their men and horses. After a sharp engagement, lasting until dark, the enemy were driven off, leaving many of their dead and wounded upon the field.”

400px-Spotsylvania_Court_House_May_07

***The map of the fighting taken from Hal Jespersen’s excellent map site at http://www.cwmaps.com/freemaps.html

Merritt succeeded capturing the fortifications at dusk, but withdrew back toward Todd’s Tavern after dark, concerned for the security of his flanks. Fitzhugh Lee lost no time in reoccupying the position. Gregg encamped his division at the crossroads.

General Meade, meanwhile, had begun his army’s advance toward Spotsylvania, with Warren’s Fifth Corps leading the march. Orders to Sheridan to clear the Brock Road all the way to Spotsylvania apparently miscarried, and he reached the tavern about midnight to discover Gregg’s troops encamped there. Furious, he ordered Merritt to finish clearing the road to Spotsylvania Court House and Gregg to seize Corbin’s Bridge and hold it to protect the army’s right flank.

Advancing, Merritt discovered that Fitz Lee’s troops had made good use of the night’s hours to reinforce their position of the previous afternoon. Attacking dismounted on both sides of the road, he eventually forced Lee’s men from the position but was unable to advance further. His men’s carbine ammunition was exhausted, and they were reduced to firing their pistols. The heavy woods prevented the employment of the battery.

General Robinson’s infantry division of the Fifth Corps passed through them and pushed the Confederates back to within two miles of Spotsylvania before they were reinforced by the lead elements of the First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia. The Confederate cavalry had delayed the Union army long enough for Lee to win the race to Spotsylvania.

Losses were heavy, particularly in Merritt’s division. “In this severely contested action our loss in both officers and men was heavy. Ten officers were wounded and 4 taken prisoners, besides 141 enlisted men killed, wounded, and missing,” wrote Gibbs of his brigade. The Reserve Brigade suffered 198 of the 315 casualties in the division, compared to 62 in the First Brigade and 55 in the Second Brigade. The relatively inexperienced 1st New York Dragoons suffered the highest loss of any cavalry regiment in a single engagement during the war, with 20 enlisted men killed in action and 91 total casualties. This was a source of some bitterness during the remainder of their service with the brigade, but the other regiments were hard hit as well. The 6th Pennsylvania had three officers wounded, including their commanding officer, and 31 enlisted casualties. Two of the regular regiments suffered losses of almost 10 percent. The 2nd U.S. lost one officer wounded and 24 enlisted men killed, wounded or missing. The 1st U.S., suffered 45 casualties, including six or the eight officers present for duty wounded. Only the diminished 5th U.S. was relatively unscathed, with one officer killed in action and two enlisted men wounded.

Declaring a victor for the battle is somewhat problematic. Both sides lost heavily. While the Confederate cavalry was forced to yield its positions successively to the Union cavalry, it did fulfill its mission of delaying the Union advance and enabling Lee to reach Spotsylvania first. The Union cavalry’s tactical successes, however, made the race a near thing and denied Lee the opportunity to improve his position before the next battle. They also inflicted heavy casualties on the Confederate cavalry it could ill afford.

Sources:

OR, Vol. 36, Pt. 1, pages 115, 128, 811-812 and 845-847.

Price, George F. Across the Continent With the Fifth Cavalry, pages 123-124.

Rhea, Gordon. The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow Tavern, pages 30-42.

Rodenbough, Theophilus. From Everglade to Canyon, pages 304-305.

Welcher, Frank, The Union Army, pages 531- 532.

 

Starting the 1864 Campaigns

08 Thursday May 2014

Posted by in 1864, 1864 raids, 1st U.S. Cavalry, 2nd U.S. Cavalry, 5th U.S. Cavalry, manning, Reserve Brigade

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150 years ago today, the Army of the Potomac’s Cavalry Corps engaged in its first battle of 1864 at Todd’s Tavern. Before looking at the battle itself, I thought it would be helpful to look at the state of the three regular regiments in the Reserve Brigade as the campaign began. Listing the numbers may seem tedious, but it will go a long way to help the reader visualize the effects of the year’s battles on these understrength regiments. 1864 was an absolutely brutal year for these regiments, and one would be combat ineffective by year’s end.

On April 28th, the regiments of the Reserve Brigade moved out of their winter camps near Mitchell’s Station and encamped about 1.5 miles from Culpeper. At this time the brigade consisted of the 1st, 2nd and 5th U.S. Cavalry, the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, and the 1st New York Dragoons. Colonel Alfred Gibbs, commander of the 1st New York Dragoons, commanded the brigade, as Brigadier General Wesley Merritt was in temporary command of the First Division.

The 1st U.S. Cavalry was commanded at the beginning of May by Captain Nelson B. Sweitzer. This Pennsylvania native was the most experienced of the three commanders. An 1853 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, he had served in the regiment his entire career. It had 8 officers and 487 enlisted men present for duty of an authorized 42 officers and 1,189 enlisted men. Its twelve companies averaged 40 enlisted men each. On the April 1864 return, the regiment requested 356 recruits to bring it up to full strength.

The 2nd U.S. Cavalry started 1864 campaigning under Captain Theophilus F. Rodenbough. A civilian appointee from his native Pennsylvania in 1861, Rodenbough was by now a veteran, his only absence from the regiment a brief stint as a prisoner of war after Second Manassas. The regiment had eight officers and 271 enlisted men present for duty, with another 131 enlisted men on extra duty. Its twelve companies averaged only 21 enlisted men each. On the April 1864 return, the regiment requested 559 recruits to bring it up to full strength.

The 5th U.S. Cavalry was commanded at this time by Captain Abraham K. Arnold. Another Pennsylvanian, Arnold graduated from West Point in 1859. He missed the regiment’s ill-fated charge at Gaines Mill, serving as an aide de camp to General McClellan until March of the previous year. He distinguished himself multiple times during the Overland Campaign, earning a Medal of Honor. Only seven of the regiment’s twelve companies were present for duty, as Companies B, F, K and L served as escort to General Grant’s headquarters, and Company D served at Point Lookout, Maryland. Indeed, the regiment had 23 of its assigned officers and 263 enlisted men on detached service, at army headquarters and elsewhere. The seven companies present mustered only 6 officers and 206 enlisted men, an average of 29 men each. On the April 1864 return, the regiment requested 630 recruits to bring it up to full strength.

Unfortunately, I don’t presently have unit strengths for the 6th Pennsylvania and the 1st New York Dragoons. The 1st New York a relatively inexperienced unit, but the 6th Pennsylvania had served in every 1862 campaign of the Army of the Potomac, and its numbers reflected its veteran status.

The three regiments combined for a present for duty strength of 22 officers and 964 enlisted men, of an authorized strength of 126 officers and 3,567 enlisted men. Officer strength was 17.4% and enlisted strength was 27%. And the hardest year’s campaigning was about to begin.

What I’m Working On

01 Tuesday Oct 2013

Posted by in 2nd U.S. Cavalry, medal of honor, officers, research, Reserve Brigade, writing

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Nothing like a government shutdown to provide more time for research and posting.  I try not to write this sort of post too often, as my assumption is that readers would rather see posts than what may be in the pipeline.  It has been a very eventful research summer, however, so I think at this point it’s appropriate.

My research trip in June was very productive, better than I had hoped for.  I still wish I’d learned how to access the 2nd U.S. Cavalry’s muster rolls before the last day of my visit, but live and learn.  The military records staff at the National Archives could not have been more professional, courteous and helpful.  Every time I thought I’d reached the end of the trail, they had a suggestion that turned up another nugget.  Similarly, I have discovered that the Denver Public Library has an extensive collection of records, including the majority of state adjutant general reports as well as complete sets of The Rebellion Record and the Supplement to the OR.

I just completed a thorough study of the post returns of Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania during the war.  This will be making an appearance soon as a brief series of posts.  Now that I have a map of where all of the regular cavalry recruiting stations were during the war, hopefully it will lead me to some historical treasure.

Reserve Brigade history.  I am convinced that I have all of the official primary records that still exist, it’s a matter of working through them all and figuring how to get the interesting parts into the narrative.  There are still a lot of records to locate and work through, so this one is a long way from completion.  Letter collections will be key to making this a worthwhile history.  Which means if you come across primary source info or newspaper accounts of the 1st US, 2nd US, 5th US, 6th US, 6th PA, and 2nd MA Cavalry regiments, or the 1st NY Dragoons, I am very interested.

2nd US Cavalry history.  NARA was exceptionally fruitful in this area, and I’m really enjoying working through the material.  I’ve already found records of over 400 of the regiment’s troopers, which will hopefully lead to more primary source material.  The current regimental historian and curator of the regimental museum in Germany, Ryan Meyer, has been very interested and helpful.

Regular cavalry roster.  It is a goal of mine to get a list posted on the website of all the men who served in the regular cavalry regiments during the war.  Profiles will be available for a small fee, but I see no reason why a free list of all of them on this blog would not be appropriate.

Learning Latin.  I completed a transcription of the death records of all the regular cavalrymen who died during the war.  The primary records list cause of death in Latin, which became very educational.  Vulnus punctum, anyone?  Surely there’s a blog post in there somewhere.

Regular cavalry medal of honor files.  I found two while at NARA and found them very informative, so now I’m working on getting the others.  I don’t have an exact count, as a couple that I had seen documented as being awarded (Sergeant Hagan of the 2nd US Cavalry at Fredericksburg, for example) were rescinded after the war.

Newspaper articles.  Vince Slaugh recently tipped me off to several articles that should be of interest to readers of this blog, including several on the 6th US Cavalry that eluded my co-author and I when we compiled the regimental history.

Blog improvement.  Still a great deal to be done here, most noticeably the creation of regimental and resource pages.

Thomas Bull Dewees, Paul Quirk and Charles McKnight Leoser.  These three gentlemen keep popping up of late, so there are sure to be posts on them once sufficient records are located.  Stay tuned.

Scott Patchan’s The Last Battle of Winchester by Savas-Beattie arrived in the mail recently.  I’ve really been looking forward to this one, can’t wait to get to the fight at the Opequon (“oh-PECK-en,” as the gentleman at the Winchester Visitor Center informed me this summer).

More to follow in the very near future.

Reserve Brigade Attrition in the Gettysburg Campaign

20 Thursday Jun 2013

Posted by in 1863, 1st Cavalry, 2nd Cavalry, 5th Cavalry, 6th Cavalry, battle of Brandy Station, Casualties, Gettysburg campaign, manning, Reserve Brigade, Stoneman's Raid

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BufordLoC

Few would dispute the performance of Gen. John Buford on July 1st at Gettysburg.  He did an excellent job of fighting his division, especially since he was short one brigade.  The Reserve Brigade, without question his favorite in the division, was miles away guarding the wagon trains of the Army of the Potomac at the time of the biggest fight of his career.  The fact that he accomplished all that he did on that July day is not only a tremendous credit to Colonels Devin and Gamble, but to Buford’s ability to employ unfamiliar commands effectively.

It is an established fact that Gen. Buford preferred regular units to volunteers.  While the performance of the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry during Stoneman’s Raid went a long way toward changing his mind about volunteers, there can be little doubt that he would have preferred to have the Reserve Brigade with him on July 1st.  Indeed, he requested their return several times prior to that morning. (OR, Vol. 27, pt. 1, pgs. 923-924)

Why was the Reserve Brigade guarding wagon trains?  The answer is simply attrition, of officers even more than enlisted men.  By the end of June 1863, the brigade was simply fought out, and needed a day or two to reorganize before returning to the fight.  During the preceding two months, each of its regiments averaged losses in excess of 15% of their enlisted strength and nearly half of their officers.

At the end of April 1863, just prior to Stoneman’s Raid, this was the strength of the regiments of the Reserve Brigade.  Data for the 6th Pennsylvania is not shown.

Regiment         Officers           Enlisted            # Companies

1st US               10                    371                  7

2nd US              17                    304                  10

5th US              12                    424                  10

6th US              13                    498                  12

Total                52                    1,597               39

A full strength cavalry regiment was authorized 12 companies, including 42 officers and 1,100 enlisted men at this point in the war.  The companies present with the brigade averaged 1.3 officers and 40.9 enlisted men.  The brigade was commanded by a major, and each of the regiment’s by a captain.

At the end of May 1863, after Stoneman’s Raid and prior to Brandy Station, this was the brigade’s strength.  Data is unavailable for the 6th Pennsylvania. (National Archives, RG 94, Returns from Regular Army Cavalry Regiments, 1833-1916. Hereafter “Regimental returns”)

Regiment         Officers           Enlisted            # Companies

1st US               14                    322                  7

2nd US              16                    334                  12

5th US              12                    421                  11

6th US              13                    468                  12

Total                55                    1,545               42

Despite the addition of three officers and three companies, enlisted strength was down by 52 men.  Many of the losses were to the dismounted camp near Dumfries for mounts to replace those lost in the raid.  Each company still averaged 1.3 officers, but only 36.7 enlisted men.  The regiments were commanded by one major and three captains.

At the battle of Brandy Station, General Buford used his 1st and 2nd Brigades primarily defensively after crossing the Rappahannock and losing Colonel B.F. Davis early in the battle.  Once his lines were established, he used the Reserve Brigade for the majority of his attacks on the Confederates, first at St James Church, and later on his right flank.  These attacks resulted in correspondingly higher casualty rates for the brigade.  The 1st U.S. Cavalry picketed north of the river for the majority of the battle, and saw very little fighting.  The Gettysburg Campaign in Numbers and Losses by J.D. Petruzzi and Steven Stanley provides an excellent roll-up of regimental strengths and losses by engagement for the campaign.  Their numbers for the battle of Brandy Station are listed in the table below. (Petruzzi and Stanley, The Gettysburg Campaign in Numbers and Losses, pgs. 5-6. Also, OR, Vol. 27, pt. 1, pg. 905.)

Regiment         Strength   Killed  Wounded   Missing       Total    % Strength

1st US               350            1           1                 0           2             .6%

2nd US              435          11         29               26          66          15.2%

5th US              330            6         17               15           38          11.5%

6th US              510            8         26               32           66          12.9%

6th PA              310            5         25               78         108           34.8%

Total              1,935          31         98              151        319          14.5%

Total strength for the brigade may be conservative, as Gen. Pleasonton’s official report lists their strength on June 9, 1863 at 1,857. (Ibid., pg. 906)

Total losses for Buford’s right wing in the battle, including the infantry brigade, were 471.  The Reserve Brigade losses of 319 were 67.7% of this total.  As devastating as these numbers appear, they may be conservative.  The commander of the 2nd U.S. Cavalry during the battle, Wesley Merritt, later reported 8 of 14 officers were killed or wounded, and 68 killed or wounded of only 225 engaged.  These equate to losses of 57% of officers and 30% of enlisted men in this regiment. (Rodenbough, From Everglade to Canyon, pg. 290.)

The campaign continued, and the brigade rode north with the rest of the division.  Less than two weeks later, on June 21st, the division engaged in another battle at Upperville. (Petruzzi and Stanley, pgs. 33-34.)

Regiment         Strength   Killed  Wounded   Missing      Total    % Strength

1st US               345            1         13               39         53          15.4%

2nd US              372

5th US              301            1                                            1             .3%

6th US              463                         6                 3            9            1.9%

6th PA              240

Total              1,735              2         19               42            63

Again, these numbers may be conservative, as Captain Cram of the 6th U.S. Cavalry claimed in his official report, “The regiment marched out 12 commissioned officers and 242 enlisted men strong.” (OR, Vol. 27, pt. 1, pg. 947.)  This would increase the regiment’s loss to 3.6%.  During the battle, Gen. Buford again employed the Reserve Brigade as his primary attack force, and they paid commensurately. The 1st U.S. Cavalry, who had missed much of the previous battle, figured prominently in this one.  Division losses for the engagement totaled 115.  The Reserve Brigade, composing 39.8% of the division’s strength, suffered 54.7% of its casualties.  Two more officers were lost, one each from the 1st and 6th U.S. Cavalry. (Ibid., pg. 922.)

By the end of June, conditions within the brigade had changed dramatically from just one month before.  Regular regiment strengths as reported on their monthly returns for June 1863 are listed below. (Regimental returns.)

Regiment         Officers           Enlisted            # Companies

1st US                 8                       313                 8

2nd US                5                       505               12

5th US                9                       441                11

6th US                9                       461                10

Total                32                    1,720                 41

While enlisted strengths remained roughly the same per company, primarily due to replacements from the dismounted camp as mounts became available, officer strengths had plummeted.  Over the month, 21 of 52 officers were lost killed, wounded or missing, a loss of 40%. (Ibid.)  This left less than one officer per company.  Despite the continual reinforcements, companies remained at 40% strength on average, with near-constant disruptions to the ranks.  Additionally, the brigade received its third commander of the month on June 30th in the person of newly-promoted Brigadier General Wesley Merritt.

MerrittLoC

Fortunately, 21 of the remaining 32 officers were former enlisted men in the regiments. (Ibid. Also, National Archives, RG 94, Register of Enlistments in the U.S. Army, 1798-1914 and Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, Volume 1.)  The brigade was still an experienced, battle-hardened formation, it simply needed a couple of days to reorganize.  This was proven on July 3rd and throughout the pursuit of the Army of Northern Virginia following the battle of Gettysburg.

To some extent, however, the loss of the Reserve Brigade may have done much to reveal Buford’s battlefield acumen.  Had they been present, it seems very likely that he would have relied on them heavily once again.  Instead, he was forced to utilize the tools he had at hand, specifically his other two brigade commanders.  Both were very capable cavalry leaders, they simply had not yet had a good opportunity to demonstrate their ability to their division commander.  They proved themselves in the crucible on July 1st.  The lessons that Gen. Buford learned about them and their commands in this fight greatly enhanced his ability to fight his division through the rest of the campaign.  A look at Gen. Buford’s reports from the campaign will show that he maneuvered the division differently before and after the fighting at Gettysburg.  Following the battle, they appear to have much more autonomy in their movements.