Tag Archives: Reserve Brigade

Fiddler’s Green: Michael Lawless

15 Friday Oct 2021

Posted by in 2nd Dragoons/ 2nd Cavalry, 2nd U.S. Cavalry, battle of Brandy Station, battle of Trevillian Station

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Michael Lawless was born in Waterford, Ireland about 1826. He appears to have emigrated from Galway in 1849 on the brig Clarence with his older sister “Biddy” (Bridget?). He listed his occupation as farmer on the passenger list. They arrived in New York on February 10, 1849, and moved to Boston shortly thereafter.

On December 4, 1849, Michael was enlisted into Company I, 1st Dragoons by Lieutenant Charles Jordan. His enlistment documents describe him as 5’7″ tall, with black hair, hazel eyes and a dark complexion. Lawless was working as a laborer at the time of his enlistment. He left the Army at the end of his enlistment on December 4, 1854 as a private at Fort Thorn, NM.

He soon rejoined the Army, enlisting in Company H of the 2nd Dragoons in St Louis, MO on March 13, 1855. This is roughly the amount of time it would have taken him to travel east on the Santa Fe Trail as a civilian from Fort Thorn. Lawless was more successful this enlistment, with promotions to corporal and sergeant. He re-enlisted into the same company on January 13, 1860 at Camp Floyd, Utah Territory. His company commander was Captain Alfred Pleasonton.

Sergeant Lawless accompanied his regiment on its march east at the outbreak of the Civil War, reaching Cantonment Holt in Washington, D.C. by the end of 1861. He served ably in the company during the campaign on the peninsula, rising to the rank of first sergeant by the summer of 1862. On July 19, 1862, he, the regimental sergeant major and several other first sergeants were recommended for commissions by regimental commander Major Alfred Pleasonton through the provost marshal of the Army of the Potomac.

Lawless was promoted to second lieutenant in the same company on July 17, 1862. Interestingly, this was two days before the date of Pleasonton’s recommendation. Due to the pace of operations within the army that summer, he didn’t learn of his promotion until September, just after the battle of Antietam. He accepted his commission on September 23, 1862 at the regiment’s camp near Sharpsburg, MD. There must have been quite a party in the camp that evening, as the sergeant major, quartermaster sergeant and three first sergeants were all notified of their appointments the same day.

Lieutenant Lawless served with Company H through the remainder of the 1862 campaigns, as well as Stoneman’s Raid. He fought well at Brandy Station, where he was one of the few officers of the 2nd Cavalry not killed or wounded. Indeed, he was the only one of the five officers he was commissioned with not to be wounded in the battle. He was promoted to first lieutenant in Company A after the battle, with a date of rank of June 9, 1863. He fought with this company for the rest of the year, frequently commanding it in the absence of its assigned captain.

First Lieutenant Lawless opened the 1864 campaign once again commanding Company A. He led it during the fighting at Todd’s Tavern, Sheridan’s “first raid,” and Old Church. in command of the company. The regimental commander cited him as “distinguished for his personal intrepidity in action and other good qualities as a soldier” during the fighting.

On June 11, 1864, during the opening phase of the battle of Trevillian Station, Lieutenant Lawless was killed while leading his company. In his report on the battle, Brigadier General Wesley Merritt said of him, “he was a fearless, honest, and eminently trustworthy soldier, ‘God’s truth’ being the standard by which he measured all of his actions.”

Originally buried on the battlefield, Lawless was later moved to Culpeper National Cemetery. He appears not to have had a next of kin, as I found no record of a pension claim.

Reserve Brigade’s Final Report

01 Monday Jun 2015

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Among the batch of late posts was this final one by the Reserve Brigade’s commander, Brigadier General Alfred Gibbs, on the final days of the Appomattox campaign. I haven’t broken out the regimental numbers yet, but four regiments consisting of only 437 men is a telling statistic of the effects of the long ride from the Shenandoah and subsequent campaigning.

Report of Brig. Gen. Alfred Gibbs, U.S. Army, commanding Reserve Brigade.

Headquarters Cavalry Reserve Brigade,
Camp near Nottoway Station, April 15, 1865.

Major: In compliance with instructions from headquarters First cavalry division, Cavalry Corps, I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of this brigade from the time of leaving Petersburg, March 29, to the 9th of April, inclusive:

The brigade – consisting of the First, Fifth, and Sixth United States and Second Massachusetts Cavalry, in all 437 enlisted men, with 20 officers – left camp in front of Petersburg March 29 at 8 a.m. Marched via Reams’ Station, and camped near Dinwiddie Court-House. On the 30th moved early, brigade being in advance, skirmishing all day with enemy in vicinity Dinwiddie Court-House. The Fifth and Sixth U.S. Cavalry, under Maj. R. Murray Morris, Sixth U.S. Cavalry, commanding, were sent up the road toward the Five Corners to feel and find the enemy. The Second Massachusetts, Col. C. Crowninshield, were sent up plank road to the right, while Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Colonel Leiper, were sent up toward White Oak road and midway between the two before mentioned, with orders to communicate with columns on their respective flanks. All the columns soon felt the enemy, driving their vedettes in upon their supports, and these, in turn, upon their reserves. Major Morris gallantly drove in the large force opposed to him and held his position within a short distance of Five Forks until overpowered by numbers he fell back, losing three officers and 20 men. The Second Massachusetts and Sixth Pennsylvania also met the enemy whom they were unable to drive, but firmly held their position. They were relieved by First Brigade and First U.S. Cavalry and two regiments of the Second Brigade, under Colonel Fitzhugh, and again occupied position near Five Forks. At sunset the whole force was withdrawn and camped near the junction of roads before mentioned.

On the morning of the 31st moved toward Dinwiddie Court-House, and about 1 p.m. took position in the woods at another fork of plank road, the let connecting with brigadier-General Gregg, and right being directed to connect with the other brigades of the division; this, however, was never effected. Dense masses of the enemy’s infantry pressed down the road and entirely cut off these two brigades from us; although few in numbers the brigade desperately held its ground for over two hours, disputing every inch of ground until finally doggedly yielding, when the whole line was driven back by Pickett’s division of infantry, losing 5 officers killed and captured and 15 men. Captain Miller’s battery, Fourth Artillery, did good service on hill in front of the town. Lieutenant Thompson, aide-de-camp on my staff, was severely wounded, and Major Morris, Sixth U.S. Cavalry, also with me, had his horse killed by my side. Brigade camped that night near Crump’s house.

April 1, moved forward through Dinwiddie Court-House and participated in attack on enemy’s works near Five Forks. About 2 p.m. the whole line moved gallantly forward upon the enemy’s breast-works, the whole brigade being on foot except First U.S. Cavalry, which, under Capt. R.S.C. Lord, gallantly charged the flying masses of the enemy with reckless fury far beyond the advance of the rest of the brigade. At 5 p.m. the whole line was ours, with large numbers of prisoners, arms, and other material. In this most desperate conflict I have again to record the loss of 2 officers killed and wounded and 14 men. On the 2d of April the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry, detailed for temporary duty at the headquarters cavalry brigade, moved toward South Side Railroad, of which it destroyed half a mile of track, and moved west, overtaking enemy’s infantry near Exeter Mills. Skirmished with enemy until dark; bivouacked on the skirmish line. On the 3d moved in rear of Third Division to near Deep Creek, but did not meet enemy that day. April 4, overtook enemy’s infantry and relieved the other brigades on picket; moved out again at 10 p.m. and marched all night, via Dennisville, and reached Jeffersonville [Jetersville?], on the Danville railroad, at 2 p.m.; formed on left of division and remained in line of battle until dark, when brigade was moved over to right and camped in rear of infantry.

On the 6th moved out and attacked enemy’s train at Sailor’s Creek; after a stubborn fight, slowly advancing, the brigade was withdrawn and moved to left, and about 10 p.m. drove in the pickets of rear of mahone’s division of infantry. While watching enemy were attacked and sharply shelled, losing four men, and bivouacked in the woods half a mile in rear. On 7th moved through Prince Edward Court-House, the advance being at Prospect Station and Walker’s Church to near Appomattox Station; met Third Cavalry Division engaged with enemy, and went on its right; skirmished till 10 p.m., and picketed with whole brigade on the right front and across Appomattox Court-House road.

On the memorable 9th of April attacked enemy dismounted, on the Appomattox Court-House road. The Fifth U.S. Cavalry were sent in mounted and down a road (on the left) in their front, but were met by a brigade of enemy’s infantry, and retired with a loss of four men. The brigade was then mounted and ordered to charge on the right of General Custer’s command, which was done in rapid style; but on arriving on the extreme right I was informed that a flag of truce of surrender had passed within our lines, and hostilities were ordered to be suspended. The brigade camped for the night at a wood near martin’s house, one mile in rear of Appomattox Court-House.

I have the honor herewith to inclose a nominal list of the officers killed, wounded, and captured, and a numerical list of enlisted men killed, wounded, and missing.

To the officers of my staff, the commanders of battery and regiments, and to the officers and men of the command generally, my most hearty thanks are due for the unwavering gallantry, fortitude, courage, and pertinacity with which they sustained the fatigues and hardships of this memorable campaign, the exercise of which only could have enabled them to take the distinguished part that they have done. It will always be a source of pride to them to feel that they, too, were in Sheridan’s army in the campaign of 1865.

I am, major, your obedient servant,
Alfred Gibbs,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Source: OR, Volume 46, part 1, pgs 1127-1129

The Death of Charles Russell Lowell

21 Tuesday Oct 2014

Posted by in 1864, 6th U.S. Cavalry, battle of Cedar Creek, officers, Reserve Brigade

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Lowell

Craig Swain’s post yesterday here on fallen leaders at Cedar Creek jogged a memory. I knew I had seen a contemporary account of the death of Charles Russell Lowell, but couldn’t remember where. Lowell had an interesting position during the battle. He was a captain in the 6th U.S. Cavalry and colonel of the Second Massachusetts Cavalry, both present at the battle, and in command of both regiments as the commander of the Reserve Brigade.

Today, I remembered where I had seen it. Charles A. Humphreys was the regimental chaplain for the 2nd Massachusetts Cavalry from 1863 through the end of the war. As the chaplain, he frequently encountered the regimental commander, so one must expect a bit of bias. In his postwar history of the regiment, Field, Camp, Hospital and Prison in the Civil War, 1861-1865, Humphreys chronicles Lowell’s passing.

“I have already told how my gallant Colonel, in this month’s campaign in which he was every day under fire, seemed to bear a charmed life, having had thirteen horses shot out from under him — one of them struck in seven places — and his clothes riddled with bullets. He had not himself been touched till the third charge in the Battle of Cedar Creek, when a spent ball for a moment took away his breath and afterwards left him voiceless. General Torbert urged that he be taken from the field. But Lowell whispered: “No! It is only my poor lung. I have not lost a drop of blood yet. I want to lead in the final charge.” So a little parapet of earth was thrown up to shield him from the bullets of the enemy, and he lay there motionless for two hours, having exacted a promise that he should be told when the charge was ordered. This came about three o’clock. Then, though too weak to mount his horse without assistance, he said, “I am well, now,” and allowed his faithful men to lift him into the saddle, and he rode to the front amid the cheers of his troops. Then his strength rose with the occasion, and though the death flush was on his cheeks he rode firm and erect as ever, and though he could only whisper his commands to his aids, [sic] all saw by the pointing of his sword that he meant Forward to victory or death.

“Just as they were in the thickest of the fight, Lowell — still leading on his men — was pierced by a bullet from shoulder to shoulder and fell into the arms of his aids [sic]. Yet even thus he would not check the vigor of the assault, but allowed himself to be carried forward in the track of his rapidly advancing brigade till he reached the village of Middletown and saw that the battle was won. Then he lay down upon his death-couch as calmly as to a night’s repose, and, though partially paralyzed, he remained for a time conscious, and gave minute directions about the business of his command, dictated some private messages of affection, and twice directed his surgeon to leave him to look to the wounds of other officers and of some wounded prisoners whose cries of pain he overheard, and then quietly and contentedly went to sleep and waked no more on earth.”

Obviously Humphreys uses a bit of poetic license in his account. From the nature of his final wound and other accounts of his fall, it seem far more likely that he was in the village or on its outskirts when he was shot.

Lowell was mourned across the Cavalry Corps. His division commander’s comments were contained in the previous post, and his corps commander, A.T.A. Torbert, commented in this excerpt from official report:

“In this general advance Colonel Lowell, Second Massachusetts Cavalry, commanding reserve Brigade, First Division, while charging at the head of his brigade, received a second wound, which proved to be mortal. Thus the service lost one of its most gallant and accomplished soldiers. He was the beau ideal of a cavalry officer, and his memory will never die in the command.”

Sources:

Humphreys, Charles A. Field, Camp, Hospital and Prison in the Civil War, 1861-1865. Boston: Geo. H. Ellis Co., 1918. Pages 179-181.

Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 43, Part 1, Page 434.

Photograph of Charles Russell Lowell in 1864, USAMHI.

150 Years Ago: Cedar Creek

19 Sunday Oct 2014

Posted by in 1864, 1st U.S. Cavalry, 2nd U.S. Cavalry, battle of Cedar Creek, Reserve Brigade

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150 years ago today, the battle of Cedar Creek was fought. The previous month’s defeat had all but ended the campaign the month before, but Confederate general Jubal Early cast one last throw of the dice to try to destroy Sheridan’s army.

I have decided to include two versions of the regular cavalry’s piece of the battle. The first and most direct, is an excerpt from the official report of the Reserve Brigade commander, Lieutenant Colonel Casper Crowninshield, on the battle. It is very brief and to the point, as he assumed command of the brigade toward the end of the battle.

“October 17, remained in camp, picketing on right of First Brigade. October 18, remained in camp, picketing as before. October 19, broke camp at daylight and moved to the right of the infantry on a reconnaissance for the purpose of ascertaining the position of the enemy; found their cavalry in force; skirmished with them about an hour, when orders were received to fall back, as the whole army had been attacked; proceeded to the left of the infantry and formed skirmish line, connecting with infantry on the right and First Brigade on left; Second Massachusetts made two charges on the enemy’s infantry, checking their advance; held our position until 3 p.m., when the whole line advanced, and this brigade, together with Second Brigade, charged a battery of the enemy’s artillery; were repulsed, with considerable loss, Colonel Lowell being mortally wounded while leading his command in the charge. Lieutenant Colonel Crowninshield, Second Massachusetts Cavalry, assumed command of brigade. The enemy’s line commenced to fall back, when we again charged, pursuing them down the pike and across Cedar Creek. Here we were halted and ordered to fall back, recrossed the creek, and camped on left of infantry.” (Official Records, Series I, Volume 43, Part 1, page 492)

The official report of the division commander, Brigadier General Wesley Merritt, is typically much more animated and verbose.

“HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION,
October 24, 1864.

MAJOR: I respectfully submit the following report of the part this division took in the battle of the 19th and subsequent operations:

About 4 a. m. on the 19th an attack was made on the pickets of the First Brigade near Cupp’s Ford, which attack, coupled with the firing on the extreme left of the infantry line, alarmed the camps, and everything was got ready for immediate action. The First Brigade was at once ordered to move to the support of its picket-line, while the Reserve Brigade, which had the night before received orders to make a reconnaissance on the Middle road, was ordered to halt and await further orders. This brigade had advanced in the execution of its reconnaissance to the picket-line, and subsequently acted for a short time with the First Brigade in repelling the attack of the enemy feebly made on that part of the field. Soon after moving from camp the heavy artillery firing, and immense number of infantry stragglers making across the country to the Back road from our left, showed that it was in that direction the heavy force of the enemy was advancing. The Fifth U. S. Cavalry, attached to division headquarters, was immediately deployed across the fields, and, together with the officers and orderlies of the division staff, did much toward preventing the infantry going to the rear, and forced everyone to stop and form line. About this time the Second Brigade (General Devin) was ordered to move to the left of the line, cover and hold the pike, and at the saline time deploy men in that part of the field to prevent fugitives from going to the rear; this General Devin quickly accomplished, and did good service, especially in preventing the infantry straggling. On moving to the left General Devin ordered his battery to report to division headquarters, where Lieutenant Taylor, commanding, received orders to advance to an eligible position on the infantry line of battle, and use his pieces on the enemy till such time as it was unsafe to remain there. Great credit is due Lieutenant Taylor for the prompt and efficient manner in which he carried out this order. He was well advanced to the front of battle, without supports from his own command, and none save what was offered by the thin and wavering line of infantry near his position. The artillery of the infantry had gone unaccountably to the rear, or had been captured by the enemy, and Taylor’s was the only battery for some time on that part of the field. It is thought that his rapid and destructive fire did much toward preventing a farther advance of the enemy on that flank in the early part of the day. About 10 o’clock, in compliance with orders from the chief of cavalry, the First Division was moved to the left of the infantry line and disposed so as to connect with the infantry and at the same time cover the Valley pike and the country to the left. This was soon done — the Second Brigade (Devin’s) occupying the right, the Reserve Brigade (Lowell’s) the center, and the First Brigade (Kidd’s) the left of the division line of battle. Orders were then sent to each brigade to press the enemy warmly, and Lowell was cautioned to watch his opportunity and charge a battery of the enemy which seemed exposed in the open country to the left of the pike. Never did troops fight more elegantly than at this time; not a man shirked his duty, not a soldier who did not conduct himself like a hero. All through the day each man fought with the instinct and judgment of an officer and with the courage for which this division has become so celebrated. Twice or thrice by movements in the infantry line on our right the enemy got in the flank of the division line and subjected it to a murderous fire; but there was no movement on the part of the men save that demanded by superior judgment for a fresh disposition to meet the contingency; no running, no confusion, where at one time among so many others there was the most intense demoralization. The line at this time, in compliance with orders given as above stated, advanced nearly to Middletown, driving the enemy before it through the open country, the gallant Lowell, as usual, with his noble command forcing from the enemy every available inch of ground. This advance was handsomely made by all the brigades; at the time it was intended more as an offensive-defensive movement than one looking to a final victory. The enemy withdrew from the open country, evidently fearing the attack of the cavalry, and the battery which was marked for attack and possible capture also withdrew to a safer position. Sheltered by the woods on each flank and the houses and fences of Middletown, the enemy (Kershaw’s and Pegram’s divisions) in our front, Kershaw on the extreme right, continued a sharp skirmish, varied by attacks on both sides, until the final advance by the whole army under the major-general commanding Shortly after taking position on the left of the line as above described, Colonel Moore’s brigade, Second Division, was ordered to report to the First Division for orders. This brigade, having skirmishers on the line to the left of the pike, was ordered to advance with the line of the First Division; it did so handsomely, fighting with spirit while it remained with1 the command; it was ordered to the left toward Front Royal later in the day by the chief of cavalry. During the entire day the enemy kept up an artillery fire on our position whit h was truly terrific; it has seldom been equaled for accuracy of aim and excellence of ammunition. The batteries attached to this division did nobly, but were overpowered at times by weight of metal and superior ammunition. So excellent was the practice of the enemy that it was utterly impossible to cover a cavalry command from the artillery fire; a number of horses and men were destroyed by this arm during the day. As the news spread through the command that the major-general commanding the army had arrived a cheer went up from each brigade in this division; every officer in the command felt there was victory at hand; they all had confidence in him who had formerly commanded them more directly in trying circumstances, and when the order was given for a general advance each veteran in the First Division bent his brow resolutely and rode fearlessly toward the goal. Words are but poor vehicles to convey a description of the scene; suffice it to say, the charge was successfully made, each brigade doing its duty nobly. The Reserve and Second Brigades charged into a living wall of the enemy which, receiving the shock, emitted a leaden sheet of fire upon their devoted ranks; but the enemy were broken and fled before the resistless force of the blow, coupled with the stern, steady, unrelenting, yet swift, advance of the infantry, who, under the new regime, excited the admiration of all beholders.

The First Brigade, in column of regiments in line, moved forward like an immense wave, slowly at first, but gathering strength and speed as it progressed, overwhelmed a battery and its supports amidst a desolating shower of canister and a deadly fire of musketry from part of Kershaw’s division, at short range, from a heavy wood to our left. Never has the mettle of the division been put to a severer test than at this time, and never .did it stand the test better. The charge was made on an enemy well formed, prepared to receive it with guns double-shotted with canister. Into that fearful charge rode many a noble spirit who met his death. One more prominent than the rest, if individual prominence among a band of heroes is possible, received his death wound — the fearless Lowell, at the head of as gallant a brigade as ever rode at a foe, fell in the thickest of the fray, meeting his death as he had always faced it — calmly, resolutely, heroically. His fall cast a gloom on the entire command. No one in the field appreciated his worth more than his division commander. He was wounded painfully in the early part of the day, soon after which I met him; he was suffering acutely from his wound, but to ask him to leave the field was to insult him almost; a more gallant soldier never buckled on a saber. His coolness and judgment on the held were unequaled. An educated and accomplished gentleman, his modest, amiable, yet independent, demeanor endeared him to all his superiors in rank; his inflexible justice, temperate, yet unflinching, conduct of discipline made him respected and loved by his subordinates. He was upright as a mall, pure as a patriot, and preeminently free from the finesse of the politician. His last breath was warm with commendations of his comrades in arms and devotion to his country’s cause. Young in years, he died too early for his country, leaving a brilliant record for future generations, ending a career which gave bright promise of yet greater usefulness and glory.

After the charge our ranks were soon formed and the command moved forward resistlessly to Cedar Creek. Part of the enemy’s forces which had bed by the fords below were followed by detachments of the First and Reserve Brigades, which captured quite a number of prisoners, the First Brigade adding another to its trophies in the shape of a battle-flag. The Second and Reserve Brigades moved to Cedar Creek (the Second Brigade in advance), charged across the fords and bridge, pursuing the enemy with unparalleled vigor to his stronghold — Fisher’s Hill — leaving, like the whirlwind, nothing but the wreck in their track to be gathered up.” In this pursuit the Second Brigade lost heavily. I respectfully call attention to the report of General Devin, commanding Second Brigade, who ably conducted this movement. Great credit is due him for his untiring energy and determination in following up the victory, toward which he and his gallant command had done as much during the entire day as men could do. The Reserve Brigade was also ” in at the death,” but, in compliance with orders, halted and formed as a reserve, while the First and Second Brigades pursued the enemy on their different roads. Night alone saved Early’s demoralized army from total annihilation. As it was, he carried off with him but five pieces of artillery and but few other wheels.

The following morning (October 20) the division moved to Fisher’s Hill, where a small force of the enemy’s cavalry was found. This disappeared from our front and the command was pushed on to Woodstock. At that point it was ascertained from citizens and prisoners that the enemy was some distance in advice. The First and Second Brigades were halted and the Reserve Brigade ordered on toward Edenburg, beyond which point it went, without, however, coming up With the dying enemy. During this pursuit a number of wagons, ambulances, caissons, arms, &c., abandoned by the enemy, were found on the road and destroyed.

During the battle and subsequent pursuit the following captures were made and property destroyed by the division: 3 battle flags, 22 pieces of artillery, 8 caissons, 37 ambulances, 29 wagons, 95 horses and harness, 141 mules and harness, 389 prisoners of war, including 6 commissioned officers; two of the above wagons were loaded with muskets. Property destroyed; 12 army wagons, 28 ambulances, 81 muskets, 2 caissons
In concluding this report I must again return my acknowledgments to my staff and subordinate commanders for their untiring energy and zeal ill the performance of their duties and implicit and unquestioning obedience to orders; they are commended to the notice of superior headquarters.
The men and officers of the command have endured all the hardships of the arduous campaign without the comforts afforded by a regular system of transportation, oftentimes without regular issues of rations uncomplainingly and cheerfully. If there have been any instances of unsoldierly conduct they are exceptions to the rule. The command as a whole is gallant and well disciplined, confident in its own strength and justly proud of its prowess.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. MERRITT
Brevet Major-General, Commanding Division.” (Official Records, Series I, Volume 43, Part 1, pages 448-452)

Despite the effusive description of their role in the battle, casualties in the Reserve Brigade were relatively light. The total was only 37 killed, wounded and missing, broken down as follows:

2d MA Cav: 1 officer killed, 6 men killed; 3 officers and 13 men wounded; 1 man captured or missing. (24)
1st US Cav: 2 men killed; 5 men wounded. (7)
2nd US Cav: 2 officers and 4 men wounded. (6)
(Ibid., page 137)

150 Years Ago: Battle of Opequon, or Third Winchester

19 Friday Sep 2014

Posted by in 1864, 1st U.S. Cavalry, 2nd U.S. Cavalry, 5th U.S. Cavalry, Battle of Winchester, Casualties, Reserve Brigade

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Today marks the 150th anniversary of the battle of Opequon, or Third Winchester. While the cavalry was primarily involved in the larger fight at its culmination, with the first of the large scale charges that became its hallmark under Sheridan, they still had a busy day.
Rather than try to hastily sketch the battle into a blog post, I have decided to let one of the participants tell the story in his own words. For those desiring more in depth information on the battle, I strongly recommend The Last Battle of Winchester by Scott Patchan. It is the best treatment of the battle that I’ve seen.

The closest commander to the source for my purposes is Reserve Brigade commander Colonel Charles R. Lowell. He served through the Peninsula campaign as a lieutenant and captain in the 6th U.S. Cavalry before he was selected to command a regiment of volunteers, the Second Massachusetts. This was his first major engagement as a brigade commander.

The Reserve Brigade consisted of four regiments of cavalry for this battle. Since Colonel Lowell commanded the brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Casper Crowninshield commanded the 2nd Massachusetts. He was the senior regimental commander. Captain Eugene M. Baker commanded the 1st U.S. Cavalry. The 2nd U.S. Cavalry was commanded by Captain Theophilus F. Rodenbough until he was severely wounded near the end of the day’s fighting, then by Captain Robert S. Smith. Lieutenant Gustavus Urban, the former regimental sergeant major, commanded the 5th U.S. Cavalry. The 6th Pennsylvania, under command of Major Charles L. Leiper, was ordered to the remount camp at Pleasant Valley, Maryland on September 8th and was not present for the battle.

Colonel Lowell’s report for the period encompasses two weeks of maneuver by the brigade, so I have excerpted his words on the battle:

“September 19, marched at 2 a.m.; reached Opequon at Seiver’s Ford before daybreak. The enemy’s picket-line was driven in by Second U.S. Cavalry and Second Massachusetts Cavalry, about forty prisoners being taken, and the opposite bank of the creek occupied in a line of about three miles, the right connecting with the First Brigade. A very gallant charge was made by Second U.S. Cavalry on one of Breckinridge’s batteries, but was repulsed, the infantry supports being well placed behind rails breast high, a simultaneous charge by the First Brigade being also repulsed. Soon after noon the whole line was advanced to the Martinsburg pike; the brigade was necessarily much scattered. Two squadrons of the Second Massachusetts Cavalry joined the charge of the Second Brigade on the enemy’s infantry; the rest of that regiment got mixed up with the skirmish line of Averell’s division. The First, Second, and Fifth U.S. Cavalry advanced toward Winchester, on the left of the pike; charged a battery supported by infantry and cavalry; captured two guns, with their caissons and most of the horses and drivers. What part of these regiments could be rallied assisted in the subsequent charge of the First Brigade upon a brigade of the enemy’s infantry. After dark the brigade was moved through Winchester and camped two miles out on the Valley pike.”

The Reserve Brigade’s total casualties for the battle were 103, including killed, wounded and missing. This was a little more than a third of the First Division’s 288, but the brigade was roughly half the size of Custer’s First Brigade and Devin’s Second Brigade. One of the men of the Reserve Brigade, First Sergeant Conrad Schmidt of the 2nd U.S. Cavalry, earned the Medal of Honor during the battle, but that will be detailed in a separate post.

I was not able to identify the members of the 2nd Massachusetts Cavalry killed during the battle. Regimental casualties included 3 men killed, 3 officers and 8 men wounded, 1 officer and 5 men missing or captured. Those of the three regular regiments are listed below.

1st U.S. Cavalry
First Sergeant Henry Montville, Co. C, KIA
Corporal Jacob McAtlee, Co. G, KIA
Private Ledoux Lewis, Co. I, KIA
Private John Siedler, Co. C, KIA
One officer and 13 men wounded, 6 men missing or captured.

2nd U.S. Cavalry
Captain James F. McQuesten, serving on brigade staff, KIA
Corporal Edward Sheehy, Co. K, KIA
Two officers and 17 men wounded, 1 officer and 7 men missing or captured.

5th U.S. Cavalry
Lieutenant Richard Fitzgerald, Co. I, KIA
Corporal Michael Howard, Co. E, KIA
Private Albert Bigmore, Co. G, KIA
Private Henry Curry, Co. I, KIA
Three officers and 9 men wounded, 12 men missing or captured

Sources:

National Archives, Record Group 94, U.S. Returns from Regular Army Non-infantry Regiments, 1821-1916: 1st, 2nd and 5th U.S. Cavalry
National Archives, U.S. Army Register of Enlistments, 1798-1914
National Archives, U.S., Register of Deaths in the Regular Army, 1860-1889
OR, Series I, Volume 43, part 1, page 111. (task organization and commanders)
OR, Series I, Volume 43, part 1, page 117. (casualty totals)
OR, Series I, Volume 43, part 1, page 490. (Lowell’s report)

150 Years Ago: Trevillian Station

12 Thursday Jun 2014

Posted by in 1864, 1864 raids, 1st U.S. Cavalry, 2nd U.S. Cavalry, 5th U.S. Cavalry, battle of Trevillian Station, Casualties, Reserve Brigade

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150 years ago today, the cavalry forces of the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia collided in the largest all cavalry battle of the Civil War at Trevillian Station. For two days the forces went at each other hammer and tongs, in some of the fiercest cavalry fighting of the war.

Rather than craft yet another summary of the battle on its anniversary, I decided to focus on the official report of the battle and on identifying the casualties from the regular regiments.

The official report of Brigadier General Wesley Merritt, commanding the Reserve Brigade, covers the period from May 26th to June 25th, so I’ve chosen to excerpt only those sections relevant to the fighting at Trevillian Station.

“On the 7th the brigade marched with the division, crossing the Pamunkey on the second expedition. On the 8th, 9th and 10th of June the march was continued without event.

“On the 11th the brigade left camp at 5 a.m., moving toward Gordonsville. The Second Cavalry, forming the advance guard, soon encountered the enemy’s pickets, which were driven in and the main body of the enemy engaged. Captain Rodenbough handled his gallant regiment with great skill and unexampled valor, charging and driving the enemy mounted, and forcing him, as usual, to cover. Captain Rodenbough was here wounded, as also Lieutenant Horrigan, of the Second. Here also Lieutenant Lawless, of the same regiment, was killed. He was a fearless, honest, and eminently trustworthy soldier, “God’s truth” being the standard by which he measured all his actions. The entire brigade was soon engaged, the First on the left, and the First New York Dragoons on the extreme right. On the left of this latter was the Sixth Pennsylvania, and next the Second Cavalry, now commanded by Capt. D.S. Gordon. The Fifth Cavalry was held as a support to the battery. The enemy was driven through a thick tangled brushwood for over 2 miles to Trevilian Station, on the Virginia Central Railroad, but not without serious loss to ourselves, though we inflicted heavy punishment on the adversary in killed, wounded, and prisoners. [start pg 850] Among his wounded was General Rosser, commanding Hampton’s old division, and a colonel commanding a brigade was killed, his body, along with most of the enemy’s killed and wounded, falling into our hands. Few less than 200 prisoners, including 6 or 8n officers, were taken by the brigade. The enemy’s retreat finally became a rout, led horses, mounted men, and artillery all fled together in the wildest confusion. Williston, with his battery, took position near by, and did elegant practice with his guns, planting shells in the midst of the confused masses of the retreating enemy. Trevilian Station was thus gained. In this retreat part of the enemy went toward Gordonsville, while fragments were driven off on the road to Louisa Court-House. In their headlong career these latter came in contact with the First Brigade, which, being engaged toward its rear by the advance of Fitzhugh Lee’s division coming from Louisa Court-House, was compelled to abandon some captures it had made from the led horses and trains of the force that was engaging the rest of the First Division, as above described. This brigade soon formed a junction and took position to the left rear of the Reserve Brigade. In the meanwhile, Fitz. Lee’s division advanced on the Louisa Court-House road and took up a line on the left of the Reserve Brigade, his line being perpendicular to the last. The two parts of the line at this time formed a right angle, the Reserve Brigade occupying the right of the line, to the vortex of the angle, the second Brigade on its left, occupying part of the other line, and the First Brigade, with the Second Division, remained in echelon to the left rear, as above mentioned.

“On the night of the 11th the enemy retired from our left front and took up position on the Gordonsville front.

“About 3 p.m. on the 12th the brigade was ordered to attack the enemy’s left, while it was intended that the First Brigade should co-operate on its left, while the Second Brigade of the division was held in reserve. The brigade went in on an open field to its right and attacked the enemy’s left flank vigorously. It was slow work, however, and as the enemy was not pressed on the left he concentrated his force on the brigade, and by large numbers and fresh troops, gave the command as much as it could attend to. Still both officers and men stood up to their work, doing manfully all that their former prowess would lead the most sanguine to expect, holding everything they had gained on the left, where the line was weakest, and driving the enemy on the right before them in expectation of a general advance. In thus advancing the right of the brigade was so swung round as to be exposed to the enemy’s attack on its wing. This he was not slow to take advantage of, when a squadron of the Second Cavalry, my only remaining mounted support to the battery, was thrown in to meet the attack. Here again the Second did nobly. Coming up on the right of the Sixth Pennsylvania, which up to that time had been the extreme right regiment in line, they charged gallantly, and, though few in numbers, by the impetuosity of their onslaught, drove the enemy back and protected the right until relieved by two regiments of the Second Brigade (the Fourth and Sixth New York). After these two regiments got in position this squadron of the Second was withdrawn to again act as support to the battery, which was ordered to advance, a good position having been gained on the right. Right gallantly did the battery come up in the midst of a heavy musketry fire, we being at that time so close to the enemy that their shells all flew far over us. Planting three [start pg 851] guns of the battery in this position, where it dealt the enemy heavy blows, Lieutenant Williston moved one of his brass 12-pounders onto the skirmish line. In fact, the line was moved to the front to allow him to get an eligible position, where he remained with his gun, in the face of the strengthened enemy (who advanced to its very muzzle), dealing death and destruction in their ranks with double loads of canister. It was now dark and I was ordered to retire the brigade, which was done slowly and leisurely, the enemy not advancing. This day the loss of the brigade was heavy for the numbers engaged. The general advance was not made.” (Official Records, Vol. 36, Pt. 1, pgs 850-852)

While I was able to track down the names of almost all the casualties from the battle, I felt that listing all of the wounded made the post overly long. Only the names of those killed are listed, as well as the numbers of wounded and missing. The four officers killed in the battle will be featured separately over the course of the remainder of the month.

1st US Cavalry:

Killed in action:

1LT John H. Nichols

1LT Frederick Ogden

Sgt E. Jackson, Co. H

Sgt William Mulcahy, Co. M

Sgt James Rathburn, Co. C

Pvt Henry Lynch, Co. D

Pvt John Normyle, Co. E

Pvt George Ott, Co. K

Pvt H.S.P. Petro, Co. D

An additional 29 enlisted men were wounded, three of them dying of wounds later in the month. Six enlisted men were listed as missing in action.

2nd US Cavalry:

Killed in action:

1LT Michael Lawless, Co. A

Sgt Christian Fisher, Co. M

Pvt Thomas Corbett, Co. A

Pvt Edward Gorman, Co. B

Pvt James Ferris, Co. F

Pvt Ariel C. Chapin, Co. K

Pvt James Levens, Co. L

Pvt Patrick McArdle, Co. E

 

An additional two officers, including regimental commander Captain T. F. Rodenbough and 1st Lieutenant Patrick Horrigan, and 34 enlisted men were wounded. Captain Charles McK. Leoser and two enlisted men were listed as missing in action.

 

5th US Cavalry:

Killed in action:

1LT Joseph P. Henley, Co. I

Corp Charles E. Asher, Co. G

Pvt Patrick Keeney, Co. G

 

An additional two enlisted men were wounded, and two more were listed as missing in action. The 5th US Cavalry’s casualties appear light in comparison to the other two regiments, but over half of the regiment did not participate in the battle.

150 Years Ago: Todd’s Tavern

12 Monday May 2014

Posted by in 1864, 1st U.S. Cavalry, 2nd U.S. Cavalry, 5th U.S. Cavalry, Casualties, cavalry, Reserve Brigade, Spotsylvania Court House

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After the two days of heavy fighting in the Wilderness, General Grant decided to move around Lee’s flank toward Spotsylvania Court House. In order to get there, his cavalry would have to clear the Brock Road and take the crossroads at Todd’s Tavern to cut the Confederate route to Spotsylvania. General Lee, divining Grant’s intent, tasked his own cavalry to protect the Confederate route to Spotsylvania and slow down the Union advance. This would lead to some of the most intense cavalry combat to this point in the war.

Ironically, Major General Sheridan’s Union cavalry had held Todd’s Tavern during the previous two days of fighting in the Wilderness, but withdrew them on the night of May 6th toward Chancellorsville. This allowed General Fitzhugh Lee’s Confederate cavalry to reoccupy the crossroads and make improvements to earthworks previously constructed by Union forces.

Sheridan planned a two-pronged attack which would meet at the crossroads on May 7th. The First Division would advance south and clear the Brock Road from Catherine Furnace, while the Second Division would advance west up the Catharpin Road. Once the crossroads was seized, the Second Division would continue west and seize Corbin’s Bridge over the Po River, further hindering Confederate efforts to reach Spotsylvania.

General Alfred Torbert required surgery for an abscess in his back, so Brigadier General Wesley Merritt commanded the First Division, while Colonel Alfred Gibbs assumed command of the Reserve Brigade. Major General David McM. Gregg commanded the Second Division.

The Union plan was initially successful. Merritt’s division met Fitz Lee’s Confederates at 3 p.m. about a mile north of Todd’s Tavern. Gibbs, whose Reserve Brigade led the division, dismounted and deployed his lead regiment, the 6th Pennsylvania, as skirmishers to the left of the road. Gibbs’ official report describes the deployment of the rest of the brigade:

“Finding the enemy to be in force, consisting of, it is believed, Fitzhugh Lee’s division of cavalry, the First U.S. Cavalry and First New York Dragoons were deployed as skirmishers, on foot, to the left of the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry. The Fifth U.S. Cavalry was deployed similarly on the right side of the road.”

As Merritt engaged the Confederate cavalry, Gregg’s division arrived on their right flank, near Piney Branch Church. Lee conducted a fighting withdrawal to the south. Once Merritt had driven the Confederates south of the crossroads, Gregg advanced as planned toward Corbin’s Bridge. He was met a mile west of the crossroads by Rosser’s brigade of Confederate cavalry from Wade Hampton’s division. In heavy dismounted fighting, Gregg was able to force Rosser back to the bridge, but withdrew to the tavern after Hampton’s remaining two brigades moved to Rosser’s support.

In the meantime Merritt, aided by Davies’ brigade of Gregg’s division advancing on Lee’s right flank on the Piney Branch Road, forced Fitzhugh Lee’s division farther south. Two miles south of the tavern, Lee established a new defensive line in some existing log barricades. Merritt attacked him there in the late afternoon in the deadliest phase of the battle. The Reserve Brigade’s deployment remained the same, adding, “The Second U.S. Cavalry was held mounted on the extreme left, while Williston’s battery came into position on a high ridge in rear, where they did excellent service, silencing the enemy’s battery and killing and wounding several of their men and horses. After a sharp engagement, lasting until dark, the enemy were driven off, leaving many of their dead and wounded upon the field.”

400px-Spotsylvania_Court_House_May_07

***The map of the fighting taken from Hal Jespersen’s excellent map site at http://www.cwmaps.com/freemaps.html

Merritt succeeded capturing the fortifications at dusk, but withdrew back toward Todd’s Tavern after dark, concerned for the security of his flanks. Fitzhugh Lee lost no time in reoccupying the position. Gregg encamped his division at the crossroads.

General Meade, meanwhile, had begun his army’s advance toward Spotsylvania, with Warren’s Fifth Corps leading the march. Orders to Sheridan to clear the Brock Road all the way to Spotsylvania apparently miscarried, and he reached the tavern about midnight to discover Gregg’s troops encamped there. Furious, he ordered Merritt to finish clearing the road to Spotsylvania Court House and Gregg to seize Corbin’s Bridge and hold it to protect the army’s right flank.

Advancing, Merritt discovered that Fitz Lee’s troops had made good use of the night’s hours to reinforce their position of the previous afternoon. Attacking dismounted on both sides of the road, he eventually forced Lee’s men from the position but was unable to advance further. His men’s carbine ammunition was exhausted, and they were reduced to firing their pistols. The heavy woods prevented the employment of the battery.

General Robinson’s infantry division of the Fifth Corps passed through them and pushed the Confederates back to within two miles of Spotsylvania before they were reinforced by the lead elements of the First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia. The Confederate cavalry had delayed the Union army long enough for Lee to win the race to Spotsylvania.

Losses were heavy, particularly in Merritt’s division. “In this severely contested action our loss in both officers and men was heavy. Ten officers were wounded and 4 taken prisoners, besides 141 enlisted men killed, wounded, and missing,” wrote Gibbs of his brigade. The Reserve Brigade suffered 198 of the 315 casualties in the division, compared to 62 in the First Brigade and 55 in the Second Brigade. The relatively inexperienced 1st New York Dragoons suffered the highest loss of any cavalry regiment in a single engagement during the war, with 20 enlisted men killed in action and 91 total casualties. This was a source of some bitterness during the remainder of their service with the brigade, but the other regiments were hard hit as well. The 6th Pennsylvania had three officers wounded, including their commanding officer, and 31 enlisted casualties. Two of the regular regiments suffered losses of almost 10 percent. The 2nd U.S. lost one officer wounded and 24 enlisted men killed, wounded or missing. The 1st U.S., suffered 45 casualties, including six or the eight officers present for duty wounded. Only the diminished 5th U.S. was relatively unscathed, with one officer killed in action and two enlisted men wounded.

Declaring a victor for the battle is somewhat problematic. Both sides lost heavily. While the Confederate cavalry was forced to yield its positions successively to the Union cavalry, it did fulfill its mission of delaying the Union advance and enabling Lee to reach Spotsylvania first. The Union cavalry’s tactical successes, however, made the race a near thing and denied Lee the opportunity to improve his position before the next battle. They also inflicted heavy casualties on the Confederate cavalry it could ill afford.

Sources:

OR, Vol. 36, Pt. 1, pages 115, 128, 811-812 and 845-847.

Price, George F. Across the Continent With the Fifth Cavalry, pages 123-124.

Rhea, Gordon. The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow Tavern, pages 30-42.

Rodenbough, Theophilus. From Everglade to Canyon, pages 304-305.

Welcher, Frank, The Union Army, pages 531- 532.

 

Starting the 1864 Campaigns

08 Thursday May 2014

Posted by in 1864, 1864 raids, 1st U.S. Cavalry, 2nd U.S. Cavalry, 5th U.S. Cavalry, manning, Reserve Brigade

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150 years ago today, the Army of the Potomac’s Cavalry Corps engaged in its first battle of 1864 at Todd’s Tavern. Before looking at the battle itself, I thought it would be helpful to look at the state of the three regular regiments in the Reserve Brigade as the campaign began. Listing the numbers may seem tedious, but it will go a long way to help the reader visualize the effects of the year’s battles on these understrength regiments. 1864 was an absolutely brutal year for these regiments, and one would be combat ineffective by year’s end.

On April 28th, the regiments of the Reserve Brigade moved out of their winter camps near Mitchell’s Station and encamped about 1.5 miles from Culpeper. At this time the brigade consisted of the 1st, 2nd and 5th U.S. Cavalry, the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, and the 1st New York Dragoons. Colonel Alfred Gibbs, commander of the 1st New York Dragoons, commanded the brigade, as Brigadier General Wesley Merritt was in temporary command of the First Division.

The 1st U.S. Cavalry was commanded at the beginning of May by Captain Nelson B. Sweitzer. This Pennsylvania native was the most experienced of the three commanders. An 1853 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, he had served in the regiment his entire career. It had 8 officers and 487 enlisted men present for duty of an authorized 42 officers and 1,189 enlisted men. Its twelve companies averaged 40 enlisted men each. On the April 1864 return, the regiment requested 356 recruits to bring it up to full strength.

The 2nd U.S. Cavalry started 1864 campaigning under Captain Theophilus F. Rodenbough. A civilian appointee from his native Pennsylvania in 1861, Rodenbough was by now a veteran, his only absence from the regiment a brief stint as a prisoner of war after Second Manassas. The regiment had eight officers and 271 enlisted men present for duty, with another 131 enlisted men on extra duty. Its twelve companies averaged only 21 enlisted men each. On the April 1864 return, the regiment requested 559 recruits to bring it up to full strength.

The 5th U.S. Cavalry was commanded at this time by Captain Abraham K. Arnold. Another Pennsylvanian, Arnold graduated from West Point in 1859. He missed the regiment’s ill-fated charge at Gaines Mill, serving as an aide de camp to General McClellan until March of the previous year. He distinguished himself multiple times during the Overland Campaign, earning a Medal of Honor. Only seven of the regiment’s twelve companies were present for duty, as Companies B, F, K and L served as escort to General Grant’s headquarters, and Company D served at Point Lookout, Maryland. Indeed, the regiment had 23 of its assigned officers and 263 enlisted men on detached service, at army headquarters and elsewhere. The seven companies present mustered only 6 officers and 206 enlisted men, an average of 29 men each. On the April 1864 return, the regiment requested 630 recruits to bring it up to full strength.

Unfortunately, I don’t presently have unit strengths for the 6th Pennsylvania and the 1st New York Dragoons. The 1st New York a relatively inexperienced unit, but the 6th Pennsylvania had served in every 1862 campaign of the Army of the Potomac, and its numbers reflected its veteran status.

The three regiments combined for a present for duty strength of 22 officers and 964 enlisted men, of an authorized strength of 126 officers and 3,567 enlisted men. Officer strength was 17.4% and enlisted strength was 27%. And the hardest year’s campaigning was about to begin.

Reserve Brigade Attrition in the Gettysburg Campaign

20 Thursday Jun 2013

Posted by in 1863, 1st Cavalry, 2nd Cavalry, 5th Cavalry, 6th Cavalry, battle of Brandy Station, Casualties, Gettysburg campaign, manning, Reserve Brigade, Stoneman's Raid

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BufordLoC

Few would dispute the performance of Gen. John Buford on July 1st at Gettysburg.  He did an excellent job of fighting his division, especially since he was short one brigade.  The Reserve Brigade, without question his favorite in the division, was miles away guarding the wagon trains of the Army of the Potomac at the time of the biggest fight of his career.  The fact that he accomplished all that he did on that July day is not only a tremendous credit to Colonels Devin and Gamble, but to Buford’s ability to employ unfamiliar commands effectively.

It is an established fact that Gen. Buford preferred regular units to volunteers.  While the performance of the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry during Stoneman’s Raid went a long way toward changing his mind about volunteers, there can be little doubt that he would have preferred to have the Reserve Brigade with him on July 1st.  Indeed, he requested their return several times prior to that morning. (OR, Vol. 27, pt. 1, pgs. 923-924)

Why was the Reserve Brigade guarding wagon trains?  The answer is simply attrition, of officers even more than enlisted men.  By the end of June 1863, the brigade was simply fought out, and needed a day or two to reorganize before returning to the fight.  During the preceding two months, each of its regiments averaged losses in excess of 15% of their enlisted strength and nearly half of their officers.

At the end of April 1863, just prior to Stoneman’s Raid, this was the strength of the regiments of the Reserve Brigade.  Data for the 6th Pennsylvania is not shown.

Regiment         Officers           Enlisted            # Companies

1st US               10                    371                  7

2nd US              17                    304                  10

5th US              12                    424                  10

6th US              13                    498                  12

Total                52                    1,597               39

A full strength cavalry regiment was authorized 12 companies, including 42 officers and 1,100 enlisted men at this point in the war.  The companies present with the brigade averaged 1.3 officers and 40.9 enlisted men.  The brigade was commanded by a major, and each of the regiment’s by a captain.

At the end of May 1863, after Stoneman’s Raid and prior to Brandy Station, this was the brigade’s strength.  Data is unavailable for the 6th Pennsylvania. (National Archives, RG 94, Returns from Regular Army Cavalry Regiments, 1833-1916. Hereafter “Regimental returns”)

Regiment         Officers           Enlisted            # Companies

1st US               14                    322                  7

2nd US              16                    334                  12

5th US              12                    421                  11

6th US              13                    468                  12

Total                55                    1,545               42

Despite the addition of three officers and three companies, enlisted strength was down by 52 men.  Many of the losses were to the dismounted camp near Dumfries for mounts to replace those lost in the raid.  Each company still averaged 1.3 officers, but only 36.7 enlisted men.  The regiments were commanded by one major and three captains.

At the battle of Brandy Station, General Buford used his 1st and 2nd Brigades primarily defensively after crossing the Rappahannock and losing Colonel B.F. Davis early in the battle.  Once his lines were established, he used the Reserve Brigade for the majority of his attacks on the Confederates, first at St James Church, and later on his right flank.  These attacks resulted in correspondingly higher casualty rates for the brigade.  The 1st U.S. Cavalry picketed north of the river for the majority of the battle, and saw very little fighting.  The Gettysburg Campaign in Numbers and Losses by J.D. Petruzzi and Steven Stanley provides an excellent roll-up of regimental strengths and losses by engagement for the campaign.  Their numbers for the battle of Brandy Station are listed in the table below. (Petruzzi and Stanley, The Gettysburg Campaign in Numbers and Losses, pgs. 5-6. Also, OR, Vol. 27, pt. 1, pg. 905.)

Regiment         Strength   Killed  Wounded   Missing       Total    % Strength

1st US               350            1           1                 0           2             .6%

2nd US              435          11         29               26          66          15.2%

5th US              330            6         17               15           38          11.5%

6th US              510            8         26               32           66          12.9%

6th PA              310            5         25               78         108           34.8%

Total              1,935          31         98              151        319          14.5%

Total strength for the brigade may be conservative, as Gen. Pleasonton’s official report lists their strength on June 9, 1863 at 1,857. (Ibid., pg. 906)

Total losses for Buford’s right wing in the battle, including the infantry brigade, were 471.  The Reserve Brigade losses of 319 were 67.7% of this total.  As devastating as these numbers appear, they may be conservative.  The commander of the 2nd U.S. Cavalry during the battle, Wesley Merritt, later reported 8 of 14 officers were killed or wounded, and 68 killed or wounded of only 225 engaged.  These equate to losses of 57% of officers and 30% of enlisted men in this regiment. (Rodenbough, From Everglade to Canyon, pg. 290.)

The campaign continued, and the brigade rode north with the rest of the division.  Less than two weeks later, on June 21st, the division engaged in another battle at Upperville. (Petruzzi and Stanley, pgs. 33-34.)

Regiment         Strength   Killed  Wounded   Missing      Total    % Strength

1st US               345            1         13               39         53          15.4%

2nd US              372

5th US              301            1                                            1             .3%

6th US              463                         6                 3            9            1.9%

6th PA              240

Total              1,735              2         19               42            63

Again, these numbers may be conservative, as Captain Cram of the 6th U.S. Cavalry claimed in his official report, “The regiment marched out 12 commissioned officers and 242 enlisted men strong.” (OR, Vol. 27, pt. 1, pg. 947.)  This would increase the regiment’s loss to 3.6%.  During the battle, Gen. Buford again employed the Reserve Brigade as his primary attack force, and they paid commensurately. The 1st U.S. Cavalry, who had missed much of the previous battle, figured prominently in this one.  Division losses for the engagement totaled 115.  The Reserve Brigade, composing 39.8% of the division’s strength, suffered 54.7% of its casualties.  Two more officers were lost, one each from the 1st and 6th U.S. Cavalry. (Ibid., pg. 922.)

By the end of June, conditions within the brigade had changed dramatically from just one month before.  Regular regiment strengths as reported on their monthly returns for June 1863 are listed below. (Regimental returns.)

Regiment         Officers           Enlisted            # Companies

1st US                 8                       313                 8

2nd US                5                       505               12

5th US                9                       441                11

6th US                9                       461                10

Total                32                    1,720                 41

While enlisted strengths remained roughly the same per company, primarily due to replacements from the dismounted camp as mounts became available, officer strengths had plummeted.  Over the month, 21 of 52 officers were lost killed, wounded or missing, a loss of 40%. (Ibid.)  This left less than one officer per company.  Despite the continual reinforcements, companies remained at 40% strength on average, with near-constant disruptions to the ranks.  Additionally, the brigade received its third commander of the month on June 30th in the person of newly-promoted Brigadier General Wesley Merritt.

MerrittLoC

Fortunately, 21 of the remaining 32 officers were former enlisted men in the regiments. (Ibid. Also, National Archives, RG 94, Register of Enlistments in the U.S. Army, 1798-1914 and Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, Volume 1.)  The brigade was still an experienced, battle-hardened formation, it simply needed a couple of days to reorganize.  This was proven on July 3rd and throughout the pursuit of the Army of Northern Virginia following the battle of Gettysburg.

To some extent, however, the loss of the Reserve Brigade may have done much to reveal Buford’s battlefield acumen.  Had they been present, it seems very likely that he would have relied on them heavily once again.  Instead, he was forced to utilize the tools he had at hand, specifically his other two brigade commanders.  Both were very capable cavalry leaders, they simply had not yet had a good opportunity to demonstrate their ability to their division commander.  They proved themselves in the crucible on July 1st.  The lessons that Gen. Buford learned about them and their commands in this fight greatly enhanced his ability to fight his division through the rest of the campaign.  A look at Gen. Buford’s reports from the campaign will show that he maneuvered the division differently before and after the fighting at Gettysburg.  Following the battle, they appear to have much more autonomy in their movements.