I was delighted this morning to have a visit from Frank Carpenter, one of the tour guides at Shirley Plantation, who was assisting me in solving a small mystery there from my reading (found here). He’d lost my business card and actually went to the trouble of hunting down my office.

He informed me that the wounded Confederate officer encountered at Shirley by Lieutenants Sanford and Sumner was one of Hill Carter’s sons, Bernard Hill (“Hilly”) Carter, Jr. According to family history, he’d been wounded during the battle of Gaines’ Mill. My curiosity piqued, I sat down and did a little research on Mr. Carter.

Bernard Hill Carter, Jr. initially studied at Eastern View in Fauquier County under Robert L. Randolph, then attended the Episcopal High School of Virginia. He graduated from the College of William and Mary in 1855. He attended the Theological Seminary of Virginia, but did not complete his studies there.

Hilly enlisted in the Charles City Troop or Charles City Light Dragoons as they were also known, as a private on May 18, 1861 at Charles City Court House. This troop later became Company D, 3rd Virginia Cavalry. His occupation, unsurprisingly enough, is listed as farmer, and he was 25 at the time of his enlistment. In July he was promoted to Corporal, and in January 1862 to Second Lieutenant.

After his encounter with Sanford, Carter was severely wounded and captured in a skirmish at Boonsboro, Maryland on September 15, 1862. His regiment, together with the 4th and 9th Virginia Cavalry, served as the rearguard during the Army of Northern Virginia’s retreat from South Mountain. They were closely pressed 8th Illinois Cavalry, and there was fighting in the streets of the village. He was paroled on October 3rd and exchanged November 2nd of the same year.

Carter was very active during the battle of Kelly’s Ford on March 17, 1863, where his horse was killed during the battle. According to Fitz Lee’s report in the OR, “First Lieut. [Bernard] Hill Carter, jr., was very conspicuous in his behavior.” (OR, Ser I, Vol 25, pt 1, pg 61). JEB Stuart’s official report on the battle adds that carter’s “individual prowess attracted my personal attention and remarks.” (Ibid, pg 59).

Unfortunately, Carter didn’t survive the war. He was killed only a month and half later, during the battle of Chancellorsville. Lieut. Col. William R. Carter of the 3rd Virginia recorded in his diary for May 2nd, “Lt. B. Hill Carter, company D, was wounded yesterday near Loar church on the turnpike & died today.” (Carter, Sabres, Saddles and Spurs, pg 60). The regiment was detailed on May 1st to screen the front and both flanks of Anderson’s division.

After Carter’s death, Robert E. Lee wrote a letter offering sympathy to his father. I hope to have a copy of this sometime next week. And I’ll definitely have to try to find Loar church on my next visit to Chancellorsville.

It’s nice to actually get to the bottom of one of these little mysteries. Many thanks again to Frank Carpenter for all of his help!

On August 4, 1861, less than a week before the battle of Wilson’s Creek, there was a skirmish at Dug Springs, Missouri between Union forces under the command of Brigadier General Nathaniel Lyon and Confederate Missouri State Guard forces under Brigadier General James Rains. At some point during the skirmish, a charge by Captain David S. Stanley’s troop of the 1st Cavalry routed an advancing enemy force of infantry. Exactly what the circumstances of the charge were varying according to the view of the witness.

According to Lyon’s official report, “The rebels’ advance perceived my halt, and being mostly mounted, became bold, and threatened me at various points, though in small force — though about 1,000 infantry advanced pretty well forward at one time under an advance of cavalry force. My advance guards of infantry opened fire upon them, and without orders from me, by a spontaneous emotion, the advance guard of my cavalry charged and drove back the rebels, but lost 4 killed and 5 wounded. Cavalry again advanced, but were driven back by my artillery, under Captain Totten.” (OR, Ser I, Vol 3, pg 47)

Captain Frederick Steele, 2nd US Infantry, commander of Lyon’s advance guard, had this to say in his report. “We then advanced upon the enemy, driving him rapidly back. Captain Stanley, with his troop, took position on a commanding spur on our left and front, to prevent our flank from being turned. The enemy was now in complete rout, a part of Captain Stanley’s troop having gallantly charged and cut through his line.” (Ibid, pg 49)

We also have two other eyewitness accounts of the charge. Second Lieutenant George B. Sanford of the 1st Dragoons was attached to the column en route to his first unit. This skirmish was his first in uniform, and he describes the charge like this:

“The fighting was quite sharp for some time, but the enemy fell back as we advanced, and at one time a very gallant charge was made by a party of “C” troop 1st Cavalry under Lieut. Kelly. He mistook the trumpet call to halt for the signal to charge and dashed into the enemy’s lines completely routing them at that point, though nearly all his own men were killed or wounded. The rest of “C” troop under Capt. Stanley afterwards Maj. Gen. Stanley and my own troop both under command of Capt. Elliott then moved to the front in support, and the enemy fell back.” (Sanford, Fighting Rebels and Redskins, pg 129)

An unknown correspondent from the Herald is quoted in the Harper’s Weekly article reporting the skirmish as follows:

“Captain Steele was still on the left, and a body of nearly eight hundred infantry, with a few mounted men, came forward on the enemy’s right with the evident intention of engaging and surrounding the Captain’s two companies. Company C, of First cavalry, was in the rear (lately front), near Captain Steele and Lieutenant M.J. Kelly, with twenty men from this company, made a Balaklava charge right in the face of the bullets and bayonets of the whole rebel infantry. Four of the twenty were killed and six were wounded, but they succeeded in breaking the infantry and putting them to flight. Four horses were wounded so badly that it was necessary to kill them — one receiving nine, and another eleven rifle balls. One of the men – Sergeant Sullivan – received three terrible, though not fatal wounds. As he was falling from his horse he waved his saber, and shouted “Hurrah for the old Stars and Stripes!” When brought to camp he seemed to forget his wounds in his joy at having struck a blow for the Union. One of the enemy’s wounded inquired of Lieutenant Kelly, with great earnestness,
‘Are your cavalry men or devils!’
The lieutenant replied that it was possible they might be a composition of both.
‘Well,’ said the man, ‘we can’t stand such a charge as that. You can whip us all out if you’ve got a decent army of such soldiers.’ “

Which of these are correct and which aren’t? It’s impossible to know for sure, but at least parts of all of them. A footnote in the OR describes Stanley’s losses as 4 killed and 6 wounded, of 42 engaged, or a loss of 25%. According to Sanford and the reporter, only 20 made the charge, so the actual loss would be 50%. One of the men under Lieutenant Kelly, a Corporal Elbridge Roys, received a commission in the regiment the following year for his conduct during the charge. He was later killed in action near Selma, Alabama in 1865.

I believe Sanford’s account that the cause of the charge was a misunderstood bugle call. I can’t think of another reason why only part of the company would charge. It’s doubtful that it was reported that way by Captain Stanley in his official report, however, which is likely where the “spontaneous emotion” mentioned in Lyon’s report comes from.

As to the results of the charge, I again tend to favor Sanford’s account. It was late in the day at the time of the charge. While the charge probably stopped the infantry’s advance temporarily, I doubt any 20 men and horses would be enough to rout 800. Receiving such a charge and then seeing more cavalry and infantry advancing through the dusk probably led to their hasty retreat.

The reporter’s account is sufficiently vivid, and my Harper’s Weekly’s circulation large enough, that it’s small wonder that there was a perception that a cavalry charge could rout infantry. Such charges had succeeded in combat against Indians on several occasions in the experience of cavalrymen returning from the frontier. Only time and blood would dispel this perception.

Eric Wittenberg has posted a multi-segment analysis of the battle of Chancellorsville and its effects the past couple of nights on the anniversary of the battle. As usual, the posts made me think a bit. One of things he mentioned in last night’s post struck a chord with me, and I decided to explore it further.

When discussing the effects of Hooker’s use (see also, ‘improper use’ or ‘failure to use’) of cavalry at Chancellorsville, Eric notes, “Incredibly, the Union high command never learned a lesson from this failure–Grant did exactly the same thing on almost the same ground a year and a couple of days later when he sent Sheridan off on a raid toward Richmond with the entire Cavalry Corps, with pretty much the same results.”

I would submit that one of the primary reasons why the army didn’t capture the lesson of sending all of the cavalry away from the main body of the army was that the cavalry wasn’t interested in capturing the lesson.

They wanted to go on Stoneman’s raid and take the fight to the enemy. “They” in this case meaning the senior cavalry leaders of the Army of the Potomac, not just Stoneman. They also thought that they had rendered good service upon their return. Granted, it did more for their confidence than any real, tangible damage to the enemy, but that was a result. As I read through old accounts and unit histories of the battle and raid, rarely do I see anyone from the cavalry say, “We should have been there” or “Things would have been different had we been there.” So in the eyes of the division and brigade commanders I don’t think the lesson was there to be captured.

The following year, on the eve of the battle of the Wilderness, the army was again abandoned by its cavalry as Sheridan set off to decisively engage Stuart’s cavalry. Again, the cavalry wanted to be on the raid. I don’t think Sheridan was wrong in thinking that taking Stuart’s cavalry out of the area would hamper Lee and help Grant. I think he could have left Grant with a brigade or two of cavalry, though, and allowed him to better cover the army’s flanks. But it’s not simply a case of blaming Sheridan. Everything that I’ve read indicates that all of the senior cavalry leaders favored the raid and were focused on taking the fight to Stuart’s cavalry. And the raid was largely successful.

The fault ultimately lies with the commanding general, as always. It was his choice whether he wanted to use his cavalry offensively or defensively. In both cases, the general commanding the army granted them permission to leave. The people who should have raised the issue to the army leaders, however, were interested in doing something else. In both cases, senior cavalry leaders and advisors wanted to raid and take the fight to the enemy instead of performing their primary mission of reconnaissance and security for the army.