Eric Wittenberg has posted a multi-segment analysis of the battle of Chancellorsville and its effects the past couple of nights on the anniversary of the battle. As usual, the posts made me think a bit. One of things he mentioned in last night’s post struck a chord with me, and I decided to explore it further.

When discussing the effects of Hooker’s use (see also, ‘improper use’ or ‘failure to use’) of cavalry at Chancellorsville, Eric notes, “Incredibly, the Union high command never learned a lesson from this failure–Grant did exactly the same thing on almost the same ground a year and a couple of days later when he sent Sheridan off on a raid toward Richmond with the entire Cavalry Corps, with pretty much the same results.”

I would submit that one of the primary reasons why the army didn’t capture the lesson of sending all of the cavalry away from the main body of the army was that the cavalry wasn’t interested in capturing the lesson.

They wanted to go on Stoneman’s raid and take the fight to the enemy. “They” in this case meaning the senior cavalry leaders of the Army of the Potomac, not just Stoneman. They also thought that they had rendered good service upon their return. Granted, it did more for their confidence than any real, tangible damage to the enemy, but that was a result. As I read through old accounts and unit histories of the battle and raid, rarely do I see anyone from the cavalry say, “We should have been there” or “Things would have been different had we been there.” So in the eyes of the division and brigade commanders I don’t think the lesson was there to be captured.

The following year, on the eve of the battle of the Wilderness, the army was again abandoned by its cavalry as Sheridan set off to decisively engage Stuart’s cavalry. Again, the cavalry wanted to be on the raid. I don’t think Sheridan was wrong in thinking that taking Stuart’s cavalry out of the area would hamper Lee and help Grant. I think he could have left Grant with a brigade or two of cavalry, though, and allowed him to better cover the army’s flanks. But it’s not simply a case of blaming Sheridan. Everything that I’ve read indicates that all of the senior cavalry leaders favored the raid and were focused on taking the fight to Stuart’s cavalry. And the raid was largely successful.

The fault ultimately lies with the commanding general, as always. It was his choice whether he wanted to use his cavalry offensively or defensively. In both cases, the general commanding the army granted them permission to leave. The people who should have raised the issue to the army leaders, however, were interested in doing something else. In both cases, senior cavalry leaders and advisors wanted to raid and take the fight to the enemy instead of performing their primary mission of reconnaissance and security for the army.

There are still two more installments on the 2nd Cavalry’s road to war. The first is the account of the second detachment to exit the state. It should post in the morning, since I forgot to bring the material home with me. The second details what happened to them after they reached Carlisle Barracks (those companies that did) until their first battles, and should be out by the end of the week.

I’ve received a good bit more information this week, so I’m not sure where we’re headed after that. I’m about ready to head west for a while, maybe to Dug Springs. Stay tuned.

This is somewhat odd given my current round of posts, but does anybody out there have any idea where Marcus Reno’s papers or memoirs might be found? I haven’t found any record of them, but since virtually everything related to Custer and Little Big Horn have been researched, someone must have found them.

I knew he’d commanded the 5th Cavalry at Kelly’s Ford in March 1863, but was unaware until today that he had also commanded the 12th Pennsylvania Cavalry and led a brigade against Mosby late in the war.

Just to maintain the tie-ins to the current thread, though, the 2nd Cavalry became the 5th in August 1861, which Reno led in battle as mentioned above, so it all ties together….

Yes, I know Civil War Interactive is due to review the blog tomorrow and postings have been brief this week. And I know I said I didn’t like the ‘coming soon’ posting idea. However, two things have led to this post.

First, the topic has turned out to be much more complicated and involved than I’d initially expected. The work is simply taking a great deal more time than I’d initially anticipated. A couple of late-breaking sources almost have me convince it could be worth an article somewhere.

Second, it’s our busiest time of year, and I’m just not getting the time I’d like to get the more research-intensive posts together. Combine that with the fact that both computers at home crashed last weekend, and hopefully you can understand why things have slowed a bit. Things will ease up here in another week or so, but until then posts will most likely be shorter and not as frequent as normal (whatever ‘normal’ is for a blog that’s 60 days old!). research continues, it’s simply getting it into a palatable format that’s taking the time. There’s certainly no sign of the end, I have far too much to write about.

With the recent discussions on Eric’s and JD’s blogs about Civil War Round Tables, I decided to once again prove to myself just how much I don’t know the Civil War, related organizations, and the internet. I’ve heard about them in passing, but have never talked to a member about one, attended a meeting or event, etc.

A few minutes on the internet confirmed my assumption that CWRTs are organizations “to bring together those who wish to expand and share their knowledge of the Civil War,” to quote the website of the Bull Run CWRT.

There are also a lot more of them than I expected. One or two per state east of the Missouri River seemed a reasonable assumption. Maybe a few in the more populous states towards the west coast, with the odd one elsewhere thrown in.

I couldn’t have been more wrong. The good folks at The Olde Colony Civil War Round Table of Dedham, Massachusetts are kind enough to maintain a listing of all CWRTs and their websites. Unsurprisingly, Pennsylvania and Virginia lead the way with the most CWRTs. North Carolina has 12, and Ohio 10. Surprisingly, several of the former Confederate states have very few. Louisiana has 3, South Carolina 2 and Mississippi only 1. There may be more that simply aren’t listed, or those that are may be exceptionally big, I’m simply working from the list. Colorado as expected only has one, and even Hawaii has one. Hawaii? Now there’s a stereotype killer.

How do these organizations go about their stated purpose? Naturally it depends on the particular organization, but generally through lectures, research, guest speakers, and field trips. Lots of great field trips, if you happen to live in my area. Wish I’d learned about these a couple of years ago. Trevillian Station this weekend, for the Bull Run CWRT, with Gettysburg next month. The Hershey CWRT has a Gray Ghost Tour coming up here in a few weeks.

And so it goes. Sounds very interesting, now I just have to find the one in my area since they don’t have a website….right after I finish this post about the 5th Cavalry’s road to war. Hmm, I said that last week also.

Not such a milestone when compared to more established and successful blogs, but I just noticed that the sitemeter for Crossed Sabers went over 1,000 visits this afternoon. That wasn’t a number that I thought I’d see for quite a while yet. Thanks to all of my visitors, and I hope you enjoy what there is to read here.

I read an intriguing article yesterday in this month’s America’s Civil War by Tonia J. Smith. The article discusses a controversial letter written by Stuart in early 1864 about who should succeed him as the leader of the cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia. I won’t retell the article here, as I couldn’t do it the justice she did, but I was truck by what occurred after the letter was written.

In a letter to George Washington Custis Lee, aide de camp to Jefferson Davis, Stuart expressed specifically who should succeed him as the cavalry’s leader. Before the letter was acted upon, Stuart was killed at Yellow Tavern. What the article does not explore is why the letter then remained confidential. Lee retained the letter briefly before returning it to Flora Stuart.

It seems to me that when he was killed, the letter should have been forwarded to General Lee. This could have helped him make a decision on one leader to succeed Stuart instead of the cumbersome system that actually resulted. Although numbers and resources were clearly on the decline in the Confederate cavalry at this point in the war, centralized leadership could have made them far more effective. Given the proximity of the army to Richmond, such a delivery could have been easily effected.

Then again, it is possible that mention of the letter’s contents was made by Custis Lee to his father and General Lee chose not to act on it. Once General Lee made and announced his decision, knowledge of the letter’s existence would have done more harm the good.

Credit for the first skirmish in Virginia goes to Second Lieutenant Charles H. Tompkins of Company B, 2nd (later 5th) US Cavalry. He crossed over the Potomac via the Long Bridge on May 24, 1861 and advanced up the Leesburg road towards the Loudoun and Hampshire Railroad, where he captured a passenger train. No shots were fired, and the passengers were released later that afternoon. One week later, he and his men would be involved in the first skirmish of the war in northern Virginia.

2ndLt Tompkins led his company, numbering approximately 50 men, on a scouting mission on the night of May 30th to reconnoiter in the vicinity of Fairfax Courthouse. They departed their camp after 10pm, and approached the town approximately 3am. They were able to surprise and capture the pickets before entering the town.

Unbeknownst to Tompkins, Fairfax at the time was home to three companies of Confederate soldiers under the command of LtCol Richard S. Ewell (late of the 1st Dragoons). A charge by Company B initially drove a company of mounted rifles from town, with the Union cavalrymen passing completely through the town before turning. The other two companies arrived as they passed back through the town, and a brief skirmish took place. Outnumbered, Tompkins made the decision to retreat, and was able to outrace his pursuit.

Casualties were pretty light on both sides. Tompkins reported the loss of nine horses and four men wounded, while capturing five enemy soldiers and two horses. Two of the horses lost were reportedly shot out from under Lt Tompkins, and he injured his foot when one of them fell on him. The Confederates reported one man killed, two wounded (one of them LtCol Ewell), and the loss of four men captured. The Confederate reports included requests for weaponry for the two companies of cavalry involved in the skirmish.

Although seemingly a successful engagement, 2ndLt Tompkins was chastised for exceeding the limits of his orders. In the words of BrigGen McDowell:

“The skirmish has given considerable prestige to our regular cavalry in the eyes of our people and of the volunteer regiments, but the lieutenant acted without authority, and went further than he was desired or expected to go, and frustrated unintentionally, for the time, a more important movement. He has been so informed by me, verbally; and whilst in the future he will not be less gallant, he will be more circumspect.” (OR, Ser I, Vol 2, pg 61)

It is not surprising that Tompkins exceeded his orders. He was appointed a 2ndLt in Company D from civilian life on March 23rd, less than two months before. Although listed throughout the reports (including his own) as a 2ndLt, Tompkins was actually a 1stLt at the time of the skirmish. He was promoted to 1stLt with a date of rank of April 30th and assigned to Company B, vice 1stLt Jenifer who had resigned. Although the reassignment had taken place, the orders (dated May 22nd) apparently hadn’t caught up with the forces in the field. It must have appeared to the casual onlooker that he was promoted as a result of this skirmish.

Things continued to go well for Tompkins during the war. He was appointed an assistant quartermaster with the rank of captain in November 1861, and vacated his regimental commission on July 17, 1862. He had a good reason for doing so, as he’d been serving as the Colonel of the 1st Vermont Cavalry since May 23rd. He assumed command of the regiment following the death of its previous commander, Captain Jonas Holliday of the 2nd Dragoons, in battle near Strasburg in early April. Although he resigned his commission in the 1st Vermont in September 1862, he continued to serve and was a brevet Colonel by the end of the war. Following President Lincoln’s assassination, he too was assigned to the military commission which tried the conspirators.

I found an account of a Grand Review of troops in Washington DC in the October 26, 1861 edition of Harper’s Weekly yesterday. McClellan reviewed a large portion of the cavalry and artillery assigned to his army on a broad plain east of the Capitol, some 5,500 cavalry and 18 batteries of artillery. According to the report, there had been an earlier cavalry review approximately one fourth the size of this one had taken place previously. Apparently it hadn’t gone as well, as the reporter mentions McClellan stating that on this occasion he “noticed a marked improvement.”

In addition to McClellan, the President and Mrs Lincoln, Secretary Seward and several other generals were present. One of them, interestingly enough at this point in the war, was General Hooker, who would later be so integral to the restructuring the cavalry in the Army of the Potomac.

Among the regular cavalry units present for the review were all ten companies of the 5th Cavalry, eight companies of the 6th, two companies of the 4th, and one of the 2nd.

It is surprising that the 6th Cavalry was able to field eight companies at this time, since the orders authorizing the creation of the regiment and the beginning of recruiting were dated June 16, 1861.

The two companies of the 4th Cavalry were most likely Companies A and E, which had served under McClellan during the Peninsula campaign. Their strength in April 1862 at the beginning of the campaign had been 4 officers and 104 men between the two companies. Captain McIntyre commanded the squadron. This must have been a last hurrah in the eastern theater for these two companies, as they reported back to regimental headquarters in Tennessee later in the month.

I was also very surprised by the following words of the article over a year into the war. In fairness to Stoneman they are a quote of the article and not his words. “In many of the squadrons of the cavalry all the horses were of one color, which will be universally the case as soon as General Stoneman, Chief of Cavalry, can arrange it. He will also brigade the various regiments, and number them as volunteer cavalry, ignoring States.”

Obviously neither of these two things ever happened, but the fact that they were considered or mentioned says something about the understanding of the cavalry at this time. Personally, I find it much more likely that this was the reporter’s idea than something an experienced cavalryman would consider.