The Escape

In accordance with the light marching order, all excess equipment was left behind. For the 12th Illinois, this meant leaving their tents, baggage, and even the instruments of the regiment’s brass band. As Lieutenant Luff later put it, “we missed the tents afterward, but managed to get along without the band.” The garrison’s sutlers distributed the last of the forage for the horses, and even some tobacco for their riders.

The horsemen began forming up shortly after dark, facing the pontoon bridge in a column of twos. Two guides took the lead of the column, a civilian named Tom Noakes who’d been serving for some time with General White’s command, and Lieutenant Green of the 1st Maryland. At the rear of the column, Major Corliss addressed his men of the 7th Squadron Rhode Island Cavalry as they tightened their saddle girths, assuring them that by the next morning they would either be free, or prisoners or dead.

About 9 pm, the column started moving. Luff described the beginning of the ride: “The bridge was necessarily crossed at a walk; but each company on reaching the further shore took the gallop, and, turning to the left, passed between the canal and the high ground near the river, and then, turning to the right, took the road over the Heights toward Sharpsburg, closing up as rapidly as possible into column of fours.”

Fortunately for the escaping troopers, it was a pitch black night. The lack of illumination was both a help and a hindrance, as units were only able to maintain their interval by the noise of rattling equipment and sparks from horseshoes striking rocks. The pickets that Colonel Davis fully expected to find blocking the road at the base of Maryland Heights weren’t there. Most of General McLaws’ forces had been pulled away by General Franklin’s attack at Crampton’s Gap that day, and the road was very lightly defended. Interestingly enough, it was the same road John Brown had used when he seized Harper’s Ferry in 1859. The column was stung out over several miles by the time the last man crossed the bridge.

The escape was nearly compromised during the first hour. Riding at the head of his company, Captain George H. Shears of Company D, 12th Illinois turned right instead of left once they crossed the bridge and accidentally departed the column. Within minutes, they stumbled into Confederate pickets just outside the tiny hamlet of Sandy Hook. A hail of gunfire turned the errant company back to the column, fortunately without any casualties.

Despite the steep, rocky condition of the road, the column held to the gallop for nearly an hour, reaching Sharpsburg about 10 pm. They nearly collided near Sharpsburg with Confederate forces withdrawing from Turner’s Gap. Avoiding them, the head of the column encountered cavalry pickets on the outskirts of town, and drove them back into town. The Confederates fell back on supporting infantry within the town, however, and a decision was quickly made to pull back from the town and try another route. They took a road leading west from the town, toward Falling Waters on the Potomac.

Given the large numbers of Confederate troops in the area, the column’s scouts kept them maneuvering on country lanes and off of the main roads. They wound their way silently but steadily between sleeping camps until they struck the Hagerstown – Williamsport turnpike about two miles outside of Williamsport. The column had moved at a walk from Sharpsburg to this mount, but men and mounts were both weary. They had traveled over twenty miles to this point at a grueling pace through the dark, a physically and emotionally draining ride. Some troopers dozed in the saddle. Whenever a horse gave out, the rider doubled up with another trooper.

Just before dawn, the weary troopers struck the Hagerstown turnpike. Moments later, members of the lead regiment, the 8th New York, heard the sounds of approaching wheels. Unsure if the approaching train was composed of wagons or artillery, Davis quickly determined to seize it regardless and arrayed his forces.

There were trees on both sides of the road at this point, and the road curved to the left just past the intersection. The 8th New York immediately formed in a line formation on the north side of the road facing it, and the 12th Illinois did the same thing on the south side. He held the Maryland and Rhode Island Cavalry in reserve on the road approaching the intersection. The sun was not yet up, and it was too dark to make out the troopers concealed in the trees.

The approaching sounds turned out to be a train of army wagons with a small escort. Four or five infantrymen walked by each wagon, and a small detachment of cavalry at the rear. Davis boldly rode into the road to halt the lead wagon. He warned the teamsters of Federal cavalry in the area and told them to turn right at the next fork in the road. Fooled by his deep southern drawl and unable to see the color of his uniform in the darkness, the teamsters complied. As each wagon passed, troopers of the 8th New York fell in alongside the wagon while the 12th Illinois whisked the surprised escorts off into the woods to the south. In this manner the entire train was captured without a halt, and most of the teamsters didn’t realize until the sun rose that they were being escorted by Union cavalrymen with drawn pistols.

Davis ordered Captain William Frisbie of the 8th New York to take charge of the lead of the wagon train, turn it on the Greencastle road and move it there at an eight mile per hour pace. When Frisbie confessed that he had no idea of either his location or that of Greencastle, Davis tersely ordered him to figure it out and get moving. A guide was furnished from the 1st Maryland, and the column quickly located the road. The 8th New York led the wagons accompanied by the Rhode Island and Maryland troops, and an unencumbered 12th Illinois smoothly interposed itself between the last wagons and the cavalry escort. As the sun came up, the Confederate cavalry escort realized that the train was headed north instead of south and moved forward to investigate. Davis ordered the 12th Illinois to charge them, and they were dispersed and driven off without any casualties. Badly outnumbered, they soon broke off the pursuit. Amongst the wagons of the train proved to be Longstreet’s reserve ammunition train of approximately forty wagons. The total number of wagons varies by report, but was most likely somewhere between sixty and ninety seven.

Fortunately for Davis and his men, Greencastle was only twelve miles away over good road, and no more Confederates were encountered. They reached the town about 10 am, where they were enthusiastically greeted by the populace. Citizens lined the road to hand up food to the weary troopers, and houses and farms hosted them for breakfast once they reached the town.

As his weary men ate and attended to their horses, Colonel Voss sent his report to department command General Wool in Baltimore. “Harper’s Ferry is from all sides invested, by a force estimated at thirty thousand. By order of Colonel Miles, I left it last evening at eight o’clock, with the cavalry, fifteen hundred strong, to cut my way through enemy’s lines. I succeeded in reaching this place about nine this morning, having passed the enemy’s lines about three miles northward from Williamsport, and captured a wagon train of over sixty wagons loaded with ammunition, and six hundred and seventy-five prisoners. Colonel Miles intends to hold the Ferry, but is anxiously looking for reinforcements.”

After their arrival, Pennsylvania Governor A.G. Curtin sent a message to Secretary of War Stanton. “United States cavalry, from Harper’s Ferry, has arrived at Greencastle, under command of Colonel Davis, Eighth New York. It consists of Twelfth Illinois, under Colonel Voss; Eighth New York, Colonel Davis, and two companies each of Rhode Island and Maryland cavalry. The force is 1,300 strong. They left Harper’s Ferry at 9 o’clock last evening, and cut their way through. One mile out from Williamsport they captured Longstreet’s ordnance train, comprising 40 wagons; also brought in 40 prisoners. Fighting has been going on for two days at Harper’s Ferry. The enemy occupy Maryland and Loudoun Heights, and were planting their cannon in front of Bolivar Heights all day yesterday. Colonel Davis says he thinks Colonel Miles will surrender this morning. Colonel Miles desires his condition made known to the War Department.”

Davis’ column had marched between fifty and sixty miles through the dark over a thirteen hour period. Despite several encounters with the Confederates, they had suffered no casualties. The majority of the 178 men initially reported missing later straggled in with crippled or missing mounts. His command had snatched one of the greatest Union cavalry successes of the war from the army’s greatest defeat of the war. In a message to General-in-Chief Halleck on September 23rd, General McClellan wrote: “The conspicuous conduct of Capt. B.F. Davis, First Cavalry, in the management of the withdrawal of the cavalry from Harper’s Ferry at the surrender of that place, merits the special notice of the Government. I recommend him for the brevet of major.”

Setting The Stage

On the September 8, 1862, Brigadier General Julius White reported to Major General Wool that enemy forces numbering 15,000 to 20,000 were approaching from the north and asked for instructions. White was commanding a garrison of approximately 2,500 men at Camp Wool near Martinsburg, Virginia. Wool replied that if the enemy approached in those numbers, he should move his force to Harper’s Ferry. After some reconnaissance and skirmishing with the Confederate advance, White determined they were too many to fight and evacuated Martinsburg on September 11th. Late that night the men of his regiments boarded trains and rode the Baltimore & Ohio railroad to Harper’s Ferry. They reached Harper’s Ferry about 2 am on Friday the 12th.

The town of Harper’s Ferry had virtually ceased to exist by 1862. The once thriving town that had profited from the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad had been reduced to a population of less than one hundred people. Federal forces had burned the armory and the arsenal at the outbreak of the war to keep them from falling into Confederate hands. Churches had become hospitals, gardens had become graveyards, and residences were barracks for the garrison. The town’s desolation was complete.

The garrison at Harper’s Ferry was commanded by Colonel Dixon S. Miles, the colonel of the 8th US Infantry regiment and a veteran of some forty years of service. General White, though superior in rank to Colonel Miles, declined to take command of the garrison based on a dispatch from General Halleck to Colonel Miles directing him to defend the post. He was instead placed in temporary command of all of the garrison’s cavalry.

At this point, the cavalry assigned to the garrison included the 8th New York Cavalry, Colonel B.F. Davis, a squadron of the 1st Maryland Cavalry under the command of Captain Charles H. Russell, the 7th Squadron of Rhode Island Cavalry under Major Augustus W. Corliss, and a squadron of the First Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Cavalry under Captain H.A. Cole.

White’s forces had been closely followed by those of Stonewall Jackson. He crossed the Potomac at Williamsport on the 11th, arrived in the vicinity of Harper’s Ferry on the 13th, and took up positions near Bolivar Heights. Bolivar Heights was a small community about five hundred feet above Harper’s ferry to the west. Other forces under General Walker made their way via Point of Rocks to Loudoun Heights, a summit of about eleven hundred feet south of town. A third force under General McLaws marched from Frederick via Crampton’s Gap to Maryland Heights, the highest point in the area at fourteen hundred feet. The highest point in Harper’s Ferry was about five hundred feet, so artillery on the surrounding heights was sure to dominate the Federal defense. If the Confederates successfully placed artillery on any of the three heights, they would be able to fire downhill into Harper’s Ferry at a range of just under a mile.

On September 12, McLaws’ troops occupied Pleasant Valley in considerable force and advanced up the eastern slope of Maryland Heights. They skirmished heavily with Union forces under Colonel Ford. On the morning of the 13th, General Walker’s forces reached the foot of Loudoun Heights and occupied and occupied them without opposition. By this time Jackson was in possession of Bolivar Heights, and pressure on Maryland Heights intensified.

Over the course of these two days, the Union cavalry units were actively engaged in reconnaissance and skirmishing duties. Captain Russell’s squadron of the 1st Maryland and the 7th Squadron Rhode Island Cavalry distinguished themselves on Maryland Heights with stubborn skirmishing until Colonel Ford abandoned them on the afternoon of the 13th. The 12th Illinois was in town for less than ten hours before they were tasked to scout the surrounding area and report the positions of the advancing Confederate columns.

Colonel Miles in the meantime became increasingly anxious to open communications with General McClellan. Captain Russell volunteered to attempt to slip through the Confederate lines, and Miles consented. Russell selected nine volunteers from his command and slipped through the Confederate pickets on the Virginia side of the Potomac. He marched down the river on that side until he reached Shepherdstown, and crossed the Potomac near the mouth of Antietam Creek. He again passed through the enemy’s pickets in this area before passing on to South Mountain by back roads. He evaded Confederate pickets there by going directly over South Mountain to Middletown, where he found General Reno. Reno, upon receiving his report, gave him a fresh mount and sent him on to McClellan’s headquarters near Frederick, Maryland. Russell arrived there about nine in the morning on the 14th, and relayed Miles’ message about the situation at Harper’s Ferry.

McClellan sent a dispatch to General Halleck on the 14th stating that if Miles could hold out for that day he could probably save him. Miles did hold out that day, but the majority of McClellan’s army was moving in the opposite direction.

Maryland Heights was abandoned to the Confederates before 4pm on the 14th through a miscommunication, and General McLaws immediately moved his batteries into position. Walker’s command reached the summit of Loudoun Heights on the morning of the 14th, and Union defenders could clearly see them signaling to General Jackson’s soldiers on Bolivar Heights during the late morning.

At 2 p.m. on the 14th, the Confederate artillery began to fire from Loudoun Heights. Their initial target was the cavalry camp below Bolivar Heights, it being a conspicuous target. Fires were quickly added from Maryland Heights and batteries on the Shepherdstown Road.

The 12th Illinois Cavalry was bivouacked near Virginius Island on the west end of Shenandoah Street in town, across the river from Loudoun Heights. Lieutenant William M. Luff, acting commander of Company A, 12th Illinois during the siege, described the initial artillery fire in the following manner: “The 12th Illinois had been in the saddle since daylight and were now resting. Horses were unsaddled, and officers and men were sitting about watching the enemy and discussing the situation, when suddenly a puff of smoke appeared on Loudoun Heights, and the next instant a shell came screaming into camp. It was followed by other sin quick succession, and they soon came thick and fast. There was no time to ask for orders, and calling to the men to “Saddle up,” the writer turned his attention to his own horse.” The regiment moved onto Virginius Island, where they were temporarily able to find some concealment in the trees.

There was no respite for the cavalry regiments during the remainder of the day. They would be shelled out of one position and seek new shelter, only to be forced to move again ten minutes later. Unsurprisingly enough, the minds of officers and enlisted men alike soon turned to escape. They could do little in the face of an artillery siege, and were having extreme difficulties simply trying to protect their horses from the Confederate cannon fire. The majority of them didn’t even have carbines, and were armed only with pistols and sabers. Fortunately there were few casualties, as the percussion shells the Confederates were using often failed to explode in the sandy soil of the town.

Colonel Benjamin F. “Grimes” Davis, the commander of the 8th New York Cavalry, and Lieutenant Colonel Hasbrouck Davis, the executive officer of the 12th Illinois Cavalry, developed a plan for the cavalry’s escape. Davis proposed that the Union cavalry attempt to break out of the encirclement. He argued that the cavalry were of no use defending the post, given their lack of armament, and their departure would deprive the Confederates of their mounts and equipment should the garrison surrender. Additionally, the garrison’s supply of forage was nearly exhausted. They presented the plan initially to General White, under whom both had served earlier in the summer in Martinsburg. White approved the plan and arranged for them to meet with Colonel Miles. Miles initially rejected the plan, considering it too risky, and a heated discussion ensued. After consulting with General White and others, however, he conditionally agreed to the plan if a suitable escape route could be identified. He assigned command of the column to Colonel Arno Voss of the 12th Illinois Cavalry, who was senior to Davis. General White, at his own insistence, would remain in Harper’s Ferry with the garrison.

Colonel Miles called a meeting of the commanders of all the cavalry units in the garrison to discuss the best route. Colonel Davis suggested moving north along the west side of the Potomac to Kearneysville, then crossing the river at Shepherdstown, but the garrison had received reports of Confederate cavalry activity in the area, and Miles feared the escaping column would be discovered. Another suggestion was to cross the Shenandoah near its junction with the Potomac and then march down the Potomac to Washington, but the ford was found to be full of holes and dangerous to cross. About 7 pm, the officers finally agreed on a plan. The route eventually agreed upon was to cross the Potomac on the pontoon bridge at the base of Maryland Heights and attempt to move north to reach McClellan’s army.
Lieutenant H.C. Reynolds, Colonel Miles’ aide-de-camp, issued Special Orders Number 120, which provided instructions for the cavalry’s exodus. “The cavalry force at this post, except detached orderlies, will make immediate preparations to leave here at 8 o’clock tonight, without baggage wagons, ambulances or led horses, crossing the Potomac over the pontoon bridge, and taking the Sharpsburg Road. The senior officer, Col. Voss, will assume the command of the whole, which will form the right at the quartermaster’s office, the left up Shenandoah street, without noise or loud command, in the following order: Cole’s Cavalry, 12th Illinois Cavalry, 8th New York Cavalry, 7th Squadron Rhode Island Cavalry, and the 1st Maryland Cavalry. No other instructions can be given to the Commander than to force his way through the enemy’s lines and join our own army.”

It was a plan fraught with risk. Over a thousand horsemen were to cross an improvised bridge in single file under the mouths of the enemy’s guns in the dark. If detected, they would be close enough to the guns for the Confederate artillerymen to use cannister shot against them. Once across the bridge, they had to turn left and climb a narrow road between the canal berm and the edge of Maryland Heights toward Sharpsburg. Ironically, it was the same road John Brown used to approach Harper’s Ferry in 1859. The pontoon bridge was constructed during the early days of Union reoccupation of Harper’s Ferry, anchored in a breach of the seawall that surrounded the town. They were forced to construct the bridge after the Confederates burned the railroad bridge between Maryland Heights and Harper’s Ferry before they departed.